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Abstract
Healthcare systems require continuous monitoring of risk to prevent adverse events.
Risk analysis is a time consuming activity that depends on the background of analysts
and available data. Patient safety data is often incomplete and biased. This research pro-
poses systematic approaches to monitor risk in healthcare using available patient safety
data. The methodologies combine traditional healthcare risk analysis methods with safety
theory concepts, in an innovative manner, to allocate available evidence to potential risk
sources throughout the system. We propose the use of data mining to analyze near-miss
reports and guide the identiﬁcation of risk sources. In addition, we propose a Maximum-
Entropy based approach to monitor risk sources and prioritize investigation efforts ac-
cordingly. The products of this research are intended to facilitate risk analysis and allow
for timely identiﬁcation of risks to prevent harm to patients.
vii
Chapter 1: Introduction
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported that errors in healthcare are a “lead-
ing cause of death and injury” in the United States. The IOM estimated that up to 98,000
people die annually in hospitals in the U.S., due to preventable adverse events. The to-
tal cost of these errors was estimated to be between $ 17 and $ 29 billion, with direct
health care cost representing about 50 %. In 2010, HealthGrades reported that one million
patient-safety incidents occurred from 2006 to 2008 among Medicare patients. One in ten
patients that experienced a patient-safety incident subsequently died. Costs related were
estimated to be $8.9 billion [1]. The report notes that there are 40,000 harm-related events
daily [2].
According to IOM, all health care settings should implement patient safety programs
that continuously seek to identify system failures and analyze their contributing factors,
to design safer systems. IOM recommends that patient safety programs focus on: the
identiﬁcation, analysis and classiﬁcation of patient safety events, the enhancement of
surveillance strategies, and the design of systems that prevent errors [3]. In Florida, it is
mandatory that healthcare organizations have a risk management program that includes
formal incident reporting and analysis. Although reports of less severe incidents, and their
management, are internal to each organization, reporting and analysis of adverse events is
required by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) (Florida Statute, Chapter
395.0197) and other (accrediting) agencies. The management of incident reports includes
1
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the identiﬁcation of related risks and analysis of causes to develop solutions that prevent
similar situations from taking place in the future.
To identify risks, healthcare organizations have a risk domain that they use to char-
acterize and classify incidents, and other types of data available, i.e. patient safety data
(malpractice claims, patient complaints, quality indicators, rounds, and administrative
information, among others). This domain allows for the analysis of data by areas of in-
terest. A healthcare risk manager or a patient safety ofﬁcer collects and combines patient
safety data to identify potentially relevant trends and patterns. Tools recommended for the
analysis of such statistics include Run Charts, Pareto Charts and Histograms [4].
Once risks are identiﬁed, possible causes should be tracked to determine appropri-
ate solutions. In human-driven systems, human error is generally pointed as the major
cause of adverse events [5, 6]. Identiﬁcation of causes has been traditionally followed by
blame and litigation, changes in procedures, and training of individuals involved. It has
been argued that methodologies for identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation of causes of adverse
events are inﬂuenced by hindsight [7] and background bias, which suggest that differ-
ent investigators will come up with different explanations [8], limiting the consistency
of conclusions and efﬁcacy of solutions derived. Fortunately, healthcare organizations
are recognizing the beneﬁts of having a a systems view of their processes. A systems
approach recognizes that healthcare workers are part of a bigger system that is faulty as
a whole. Therefore, systems should be designed taking into consideration potentially
dangerous interactions among people, facilities and equipment, and ensuring that these
are constrained from situations that may lead to adverse outcomes.
The most commonly used risk identiﬁcation methods are Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) and Root Cause Analysis (RCA). FMEA is a prospective method that
uses brainstorming to combine experts’ opinions to measure and rank risks. RCA is a
retrospective methodology based on investigation procedures. These methods provide
tools to organize current information and data about risk, but data processing and anal-
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ysis depends mostly on the investigator. Therefore, these risk analysis methods are time
consuming, infrequent, and exhibit some bias. The main reason for the popularity of these
types of analysis lies on the availability and format of available data.
A major concern for the IOM, and a challenge for healthcare organizations, has been
the lack and limitations of patient safety data to allow for analysis using traditional, statis-
tics based risk analysis techniques. Patient safety data consist of facts, observations, or
measurements that lead to the identiﬁcation of failures that harmed (or could have harmed)
patients. Adverse events are the most common form of patient safety data because they
presumably evidence failure. However, not all adverse events are caused by failures in the
system, and not all failures in the system result in adverse events. Alternative forms of
patient safety data include near-miss reports, compliance, and assessment of safety culture
[9–12]. This challenge opens up an area of research that rises from the need to develop
methodologies that systematically process patient safety data in a timely and unbiased
manner.
The need for the development of formal tools to systematically organize, process
and analyze patient safety data is important to provide direction for risk analysis, and
to help analysts in their efforts to make sense of risk. Centralized and automated data
analysis helps “overcome limitations of the human mind” [13]. Such analysis also allows
for the identiﬁcation of interactions or potential risk sources that the naked eye is likely
to miss, and improves the timeliness of feedback. Risk managers could then focus on
understanding the system, identifying sources of risk and developing strategies to prevent
or solve patient safety problems.
Healthcare risk analysis should accommodate inputs from expertise and keep track
of the learning that takes place over time. The development of healthcare risk analysis
support tools requires the use of models that capture existing risk knowledge and relate it
to upcoming patient safety data. The ﬁelds of general safety and reliability provide mod-
els that could potentially be adapted to the healthcare environment. For example, several
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authors [14–17] propose to view risk and accidents in terms of ineffective safety con-
straints and controls. These models provide insight into what can be deﬁned as sources
of risk, and thus monitored over time to track and prevent potential failures. In addition,
there are modeling techniques intended to cope with limitations and uncertainty of data.
For instance, the principle of maximum entropy is often used to estimate a probability
distribution when available data is incomplete [18].
Most of these models have been successfully applied to in different contexts. Nev-
ertheless their application to risks in healthcare systems has not been extensive due to
the nature of these kinds of systems. Different approaches will pose different challenges
when applied to healthcare environments. For example, in human-driven systems, such
as healthcare, each component of the system, as well as all possible interactions, can be
regarded as a potential source of risk. There are inﬁnitely many interaction possibilities,
so analysis including all of them would be impractical. Thus, there is need to develop
models of risk in healthcare systems that explicitly deﬁne and characterize potential risk
sources.
This research explores the use of analytical tools to support the systematic analysis
of patient safety data to monitor risk and its sources. The next chapter introduces the
state of the art of risk analysis in healthcare systems, and presents a framework for the
development of models intended to support patient safety management. This chapter
corresponds to a paper that is currently submitted for publication. Chapter 3 presents
the development and implementation of a near-miss reporting and analysis system to
guide the identiﬁcation of sources of risk. This chapter corresponds to a paper accepted
for publication in the Journal of Biomedical Informatics [19]. Chapter 4 introduces the
concept of patient safety interventions and illustrates their use in characterizing potential
sources of risk to facilitate risk analysis using traditional methods. Chapter 5 proposes a
model based on the principle of maximum entropy to assess the performance of patient
4
safety interventions in terms of available data. Finally, chapter 6 presents a summary of
this dissertation and comments on future research directions.
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Chapter 2: The Challenge and Opportunity of Modeling Risk in the Delivery of
Healthcare
2.1 Introduction
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) reported that errors in healthcare are a “lead-
ing cause of death and injury” in the United States exceeding motor vehicle accidents,
breast cancer and AIDS [20]. The IOM estimated that up to 98,000 people die annually
in hospitals in the U.S. due to preventable adverse events. The total cost of these errors
was estimated to be between $17 and $29 billion with direct healthcare cost represent-
ing over 50%. Following this report, in 2005 the IOM reported that “at least 1.5 million
Americans are sickened, injured or killed each year by errors in prescribing, dispensing
and taking medication”, with extra medical costs conservatively estimated to be $3.5
billion a year [21, 22]. In 2008, a study from AHRQ (Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality) estimated the costs of surgical errors to be nearly $1.5 billion per year for
employers and insurance companies [23]. In 2010, HealthGrades reported that one mil-
lion patient-safety incidents occurred from 2006 to 2008 among Medicare patients. One
in ten patients that experienced a patient-safety incident subsequently died. Costs related
were estimated to be $8.9 billion [1]. The report notes that there are 40,000 harm-related
events daily [2]. Furthermore, there are indirect costs of errors that affect patients (op-
portunity costs, loss of trust in the system, diminished satisfaction, time lost from work,
and physical discomfort), healthcare professionals (diminished satisfaction, loss of morale
and frustration), society (lost worker productivity, reduced school attendance, lower levels
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of population health), and the healthcare system (cost of error mitigation, and litigation)
[24].
Healthcare demands the effective monitoring and control of systems, so that they ac-
tually contribute to improve the health of the community and consequently maximize the
value of health expenditures [25]. Many health care institutes and associations have called
for the development and implementation of tools to assist in the reduction of preventable
adverse outcomes in the delivery of care. These efforts fall under the umbrella of patient
safety which basically implies the prevention of harm to patients as a consequence of the
delivery of care [26].
Healthcare managers and other stakeholders should be provided with effective tools to
understand the system and monitor risks that compromise patient safety to deﬁne priori-
ties, allocate resources and evaluate potential solutions, This article presents an overview
of common methods used to assess and monitor risks in healthcare, as well as in other
industries, and explores alternative model-based methods proposed by several authors to
identify opportunities for modeling risk in the delivery of healthcare.
Over the years, several methodologies for the identiﬁcation, evaluation and man-
agement of risks in healthcare have been proposed by safety, health, and engineering
investigators [27, 28]. These methods are focused mostly on analyzing adverse events and
identifying the source of human error. It has been argued that hindsight and background
bias may limit the consistency of conclusions drawn from such methods, and therefore
the efﬁciency of derived solutions [7, 8]. The effective identiﬁcation of actual errors and
their differentiation from system failures will lead to increased opportunities in improving
outcomes in healthcare delivery.
This paper focuses on exploring the state of the art of the identiﬁcation, assessment
and control of risks that compromise patient safety to develop a framework to support
model-based risk management. The aims of this article are: (1) to explore the existing
patient safety knowledge base, (2) to review analytical tools currently used in healthcare
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organizations to manage patient safety and (3) model-based methodologies, proposed or
applied in patient safety efforts; and (4) to identify opportunities to enhance the analysis
of risks in the delivery of care to support patient safety management through modeling.
We review the safety and patient safety literature with emphasis in risk assessment and
monitoring, as they relate to the study and prevention of adverse events.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 addresses aim (1) by introducing con-
cepts related to patient safety, including quality of care and human error. Section 2.3 ad-
dresses aim (2) by presenting an overview of safety and concepts related, emphasizing the
case of aviation. Section 2.4 describes healthcare risk management through patient safety
programs and introduces models found in the literature, thus addressing aim (3). Section
2.5 addresses aim (4) by discussing the desirable characteristics of models intended to
monitor risk in healthcare processes. Concluding remarks are summarized in section 2.6.
2.2 Healthcare Delivery: Quality, Patient Safety and Human Error
The products of healthcare processes are mainly services intended to improve quality
of life, generally in the presence of an illness or an undesirable condition. These services
are expected to diminish or (hopefully) eliminate such conditions. Yet, current evidence
suggests that healthcare delivery adds risk to the condition of the patient [29].
Healthcare delivery systems are socio-technical structures that encompass different
levels of inﬂuence, e.g. operations, management, and regulators [17, 30–32]. The inter-
actions of components within and across different levels are ultimately driven by patient
needs. As a result, healthcare delivery is a dynamic, human-oriented system whose com-
ponents are connected by education, laws, policies, protocols, and procedures [14].
At the operational level, the human oriented nature of healthcare systems implies that
provider knowledge, skills, and even mood, may inﬂuence performance [33], as in the
case of diagnosis [34]. This effect is compounded by patient differences. Although some
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decision support tools such as evidence-based care are available, they do not guarantee
homogeneity in outcomes. Therefore, healthcare outcomes exhibit high variability, which
affects the quality of care [35].
The IOM deﬁnes quality as “the degree to which health services for individuals and
populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are consistent with
current professional knowledge” [36]. Safety is the ﬁrst of six aims of the IOM for a
quality healthcare system, together with effectiveness, patient centeredness, timeliness,
efﬁciency and equitability. Safety is an “important subset of quality” that depends on the
interaction of the components in the healthcare system [37]. In contrast to other sectors,
quality and safety are directly intermingled in healthcare [5]; failures that jeopardize
patient safety negatively impact quality [38]. Conversely, quality improvement programs
can enhance patient safety [35].
According to the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF), patient safety refers
to “avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming
from failures in the processes of healthcare itself” [37]. In human-driven systems, such as
healthcare, human error is the most accounted cause of failure [5]. It has been estimated
that 70-80% of the investigations of accidents conclude that human error is the main
cause [6, 17]. A reason for this is the signiﬁcantly improved reliability of the technol-
ogy used in high risk industries, such as chemical and nuclear power plants [39]. Al-
though there are several methodologies that claim to offer a systematic approach to de-
termine causes of events, most of them are inﬂuenced by hindsight [7] and background
bias, which suggests that different investigators will arrive at different explanations [8].
In reality, not all adverse events are caused by errors. System failures may be hidden
(in the blunt-end) and cause harm when aggravated by human performance (sharp-end).
On the other hand, not all errors result in adverse events [40]. Error outcomes range from
those that occur without injury to those that cause preventable death. In general, we refer
to two possible error outcomes: near-misses and adverse events.
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Adverse events are preventable outcomes that develop into temporary or permanent
disability, or death. In healthcare, not all fatal outcomes are caused by errors since they
can be a natural consequence of the disease, and may not be preventable. Yet, adverse
events are the most known types of outcomes of medical errors, since they are the focus
of classic patient safety reports. On the other hand, near-misses (a term borrowed from
aviation) denote adverse events that did not occur because of the intervention of an in-
dividual or by a “fortunate” natural evolution of the circumstances [41]. Near-miss in a
clinical context refers to incidents that produce no harm.
Dillon and Tinsley [42] suggest that, while adverse events are considered evidence
of failure, near-misses are often perceived as successful outcomes rather than potential
failures. Still, near-misses are believed to share most of the characteristics of adverse
events, including their causes [43]. Furthermore, they may evidence the potential for
adverse events [12, 32]. Even so, most efforts to improve patient safety focus on studying
observed adverse events. Patient safety has traditionally relied upon error identiﬁcation,
blame allocation, and litigation. However, the literature shows a trend to encourage a
system approach to safety [44]. A system approach consists of designing systems that,
while considering the vulnerability of the human condition, identify sources of error, help
prevent them, and avoid harm to patients [45, 46].
A systems approach to safety is supported by Reason’s studies of human error and
system disaster in which harm is deﬁned as the consequence of a series of components
failing to protect against error [47]. In this context, the cause of errors is not careless
workers, but defective systems which, once improved, can signiﬁcantly reduce preventable
harm [46]. According to Cook and Woods [48] people should be considered as the “pri-
mary source of resilience in creating safety” and they must be provided with the tools to
understand the systems and their gaps so they can be proactive under any circumstance.
The IOM urged healthcare organizations to prioritize patient safety through the cre-
ation of patient safety programs that aim to prevent harm to individuals [20]. Currently,
10
these programs are a requirement for the accreditation of hospitals by the Joint Commis-
sion (JC). Therefore, most organizations have established patient safety committees [46,
49, 50]. Patient safety programs focus on the identiﬁcation, analysis and classiﬁcation of
error-triggering events and the design of systems that prevent errors [26]. Some argue that
the rate of development of such programs needs to increase [3] and most organizations
still appear to lack in the implementation of fundamental quality and safety standards
[45, 51, 52].
2.3 Risk Assessment and Hazard Identiﬁcation
Safety is a condition that denotes freedom from harm [49]. It is a “dynamic property
of systems” [53] that is directly related with the effective management of errors under
the presence of situations that have the potential to damage or deteriorate the quality of
life of individuals or communities [54, 55]. As a science, safety uses theories of accident
causation and systems’ models to identify root causes of failures. It aims to keep indi-
viduals from harm by identifying hazards and providing guidelines to prevent failures
or protect from the effects of possible adverse outcomes. The identiﬁcation of hazards
and quantiﬁcation of potential harm have been challenging topics for safety experts in
all ﬁelds. One way to measure potential harm is to assess the probability and severity of
potential adverse events.
The combination of the probability of adverse events and the severity of their potential
harm under dangerous conditions is called risk. The lower the risk is, the safer the system
appears to operate. Every process has some risk. Risks can be tangible, such as exposure
to gas, and intangible, such as the potential for terrorist attacks. Tangible risks are easier
to study because they involve a physical and measurable feature, while intangible risks
have to be assessed through other, observable characteristics of the system that appear to
be correlated.
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Risk management focuses on identifying, modeling, monitoring, and analyzing haz-
ards to determine how safe systems are. As the system grows in complexity or delicacy,
the risk management function becomes more critical and difﬁcult since models are harder
to develop and validate [56].
Traditionally, adverse events are investigated to identify their sources (or hazards)
and prevent their recurrence. Yet, some of the most devastating failures are rare events
and their probability of recurrence is very low. Frequently, accident investigations tend to
focus on human factors as the cause and solutions generally consist of system redesign,
making it more complex and introducing new, unrecognized hazards [56, 57]. These new
latent failures will become a concern when their undesirable consequences are observed.
The availability of reliable data on the frequency and the nature of failures allows for
the development of models that provide a practical way to understand risk and enhance
safety by giving insight into the causes of failure and their possible consequences [58].
Lack of data implies that models may not represent reality and strategies to prevent ad-
verse events may not match what is needed [54, 59].
Gathering data is more difﬁcult when dealing with intangible risks. For example,
preventing gas poisoning in the workplace can be achieved by measuring and monitoring
gas concentration with a sensor and activating an alarm when current concentrations
go above safe levels. However, deﬁning and monitoring an indicator for the probability
of the occurrence, and expected consequences, of errors in medical decision making is
not straightforward. In this case, more expertise and deeper analysis is required [60].
Healthcare delivery is an example of a system were intangible risks prevail. In such cases,
properly designed reporting systems could provide relevant information on hazards, fail-
ures and potential consequences.
Systematic reporting helps to identify the weaknesses of the system before an accident
occurs. For example, effective near-miss reporting allows proactive learning and efﬁcient
management of risk, therefore improving safety [61]. Schemes for reporting near misses
12
have been institutionalized in aviation, nuclear power environments, petrochemical pro-
cessing, steel production and military operations. Near-miss reporting in aviation and
the nuclear power industry is non-punitive. The aviation sector gathers information on
near-misses that are investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board. These data
come from incident reporting systems and have been used to redesign aircraft, improve
air trafﬁc control systems, and enhance pilot training [11]. However, data by itself is
not enough to enhance safety. Data must be analyzed in an unbiased manner to develop
models that lead to valid conclusions about the system’s operation. Below are some of the
most commonly used risk analysis methodologies.
2.3.1 Risk Analysis
Risk analysis is a set of systematic activities that lead to the identiﬁcation and evalu-
ation of potential failures and their consequences. There are different phases in the risk
analysis process, such as risk identiﬁcation, risk modeling, failure assessment, measure-
ment of potential consequences, and development and evaluation of preventive or mitigat-
ing actions. There are a number of techniques to support these activities, and their choice
depends on the objectives of the analysis, and the characteristics of the system. Risk anal-
ysis techniques can be broadly classiﬁed as qualitative and quantitative. A complete risk
analysis uses a mix of methodologies to address different phases of the process.
Qualitative methods for risk analysis are popular when it is difﬁcult to determine the
probability of events. This is the case for events that are highly inﬂuenced by human
factors, and whose associated data is limited. Besides, these approaches are relatively
easy to understand and implement, though time consuming. Qualitative methods broadly
consist of the systematic investigation and team analysis of (past or potential) events
to determine corrective actions, process redesign, and policy changes. Essentially, they
consist of methodical ways to organize available data and draw conclusions from it. Most
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of the time, data consist of descriptions of witnesses and experts, and resulting models are
verbal and symbolic representations of the system and proposed solutions. Some of the
most used qualitative methods are presented in table 2.1. Among these, there are method-
ologies that guide the investigation of causes such as the traditional Root Cause Analysis
(RCA), and Critical Incident Technique (CIT). There are also the tools that aid in the
understanding and analysis of the causes and their relations, such as Event and Fault Tree
Analysis. Some qualitative tools aid in the (prospective) analysis of potential risks, such
as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). Frequently, qualitative risk analysis is used
to identify the likely failures without necessarily measuring their probabilities. In this
case, the objective is to introduce defenses that eliminate the occurrence of such failures
[62].
Although the immediate beneﬁts of qualitative methodologies have made them pop-
ular in most systems, particularly in healthcare, the ability to quantify outcomes from
descriptive data is advantageous, especially in evaluating solutions, justifying resources,
and monitoring long term effectiveness.
Quantitative methods are mostly used at the technical level where risks are tangible
and associated with the reliability of processes, equipment and parts. These methods
provide measures of risk and uncertainty allowing for ranking of accident scenarios, prior-
itization of solutions, allocation of resources, and translation of results into explicit costs
and beneﬁts [69].
The lack of structured and consistent data is the prominent issue in modeling and
quantifying human-behavior-related risk. Therefore most quantitative approaches base
their measures in expert opinions. Lyons et al. [70] present a summary of some popular
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) techniques that have been used, or have potential to
be applied, in healthcare systems. Table 2.2 presents some methodologies and tools that
have been used in quantitatively assessing risk of systems. The most commonly used is
FMEA, which was initially introduced into healthcare in the area of medical devices, but
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Table 2.1: Qualitative methods for risk analysis
Root cause analysis
RCA
Retrospective methodology that addresses the root causes of observed
incidents. Seeks answers about the problem, its consequences, and
causal relationships. Used to analyze adverse events, near-misses and
other important events [60]
Hazard and
Operability Studies
HAZOP
Prospective methodology founded in the principle that hazards are due
to deviations from normal operation. Seeks to identify the possible
deviations by analyzing the design and operations [63]. Frequently
applied in petroleum, petrochemical and chemical industries [64]. Seeks
to deﬁne detection methods and corrective actions for the most critical
failure modes.
Critical Incident
Analysis or
Technique CIT
Retrospective methodology used to collect and analyze reports of
behaviors. Determines that an incident is likely to occur with minimum
evidence of agreement of independent observers, and provides practical
and quick solutions. Applied in business, organizational psychology,
education, and industry [65].
Event tree analysis Visual tool to represent scenarios when speciﬁc initiating events occur,
and depict the relations between associated events.
First order
reliability methods
FORM
Iteratively calculates a reliability index for limit-state functions of
speciﬁed input variables such as stress [66]. Used in decision making
processes with parameter uncertainty (e.g. analysis of structures dealing
with earthquakes)
Fault Tree Analysis
FTA
Identiﬁes an undesired event, and explores and represents possible
causes and their relations by logical connectors “AND” and “OR”.
Assesses and measures the availability, maintainability, and reliability
of the system, relative to failures [67, 68].
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has been recommended by the JC for proactive risk management [44, 46, 71]. Others like
PRA have been successfully used in various industrial sectors and have been evolving to
be usable in human driven systems (ST-PRA) [28, 50]. However, some believe that their
success in such systems has limited potential [14].
The success of risk analysis lies in choosing the right approach to develop risk models
that allow learning about how the system performs under different conditions, and assess
the effects of proposed changes to make risk informed decisions [62]. Other important
success factors include: follow-up to implementation, feedback to decision makers, and
monitoring for necessary adjustments or corrections to the initial assumptions, especially
when models are adapted from other types of systems or industries.
Healthcare processes are generally compared to aviation processes. Some resem-
blance can be found in that both sectors have human-technology interactions and involve
critical decision-making [72]. Yet there are differences such as the physics/mechanics of
the processes that dictate the availability and suitability of predictive models, and how the
consequences of a single failure will impact a community. Nevertheless, it is believed that
the success in aviation safety enhancement can be translated to healthcare [73].
2.3.2 The Case of Aviation: Near-Miss Analysis
Traditionally, risk analysis is motivated by the occurrence of an accident after which
an exhaustive investigation of causes is performed with the purpose of learning from
the relations between the ’remembered’ inputs and the observed outputs and preventing
reoccurrence. Such an approach has limited value in processes like aviation operations
where accidents are sporadic but remarkably noticeable [72]. Hence, aviation shifted to an
enhanced safety culture that allows proactive risk management by promoting prevention
of future (unseen) adverse events.
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Table 2.2: Quantitative/semi-quantitative methods for risk analysis
Failure Mode and
Effect Analysis
FMEA
Prospective methodology to identify potential failure modes of activities
or systems, assign probabilities and identify causes and effects. Seeks to
deﬁne detection methods and corrective actions for more likely failure
modes.
Failure Mode
Effects and
Criticality Analysis
FMECA
New version of FMEA that includes criticality: a relative measure of
the consequences of a failure mode and its frequency. Ranks potential
failure modes according to criticality. Seeks to deﬁne detection methods
and corrective actions for the most critical failure modes.
Probabilistic Risk
Assessment PRA
Organizes the sequence of events through an event tree with proba-
bilities assigned to each branch of the tree. Uses Bayesian analysis to
calculate the overall risk. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires
that nuclear power plants in the United States use PRA to identify and
quantify vulnerabilities to failure. PRA has limited use in complex,
human-driven systems.
Socio-Technical
Probabilistic Risk
Assessment ST-
PRA
Emerged from PRA to include human factors in identifying high
priority safety needs.
First order
reliability methods
FORM
Iteratively calculates a reliability index for limit-state functions of
speciﬁed input variables such as stress [66]. Used in decision making
processes with parameter uncertainty (e.g. analysis of structures dealing
with earthquakes)
Markov Method Analyzes systems with constant failure and repair rates. It is based on
certain assumptions regarding the transition between states and their
probabilities. Used for reliability and human error analysis.
Bayesian Analysis Estimates the probability of expected events given the occurrence of
some other observable and related events.
Simulation Uses a physical or a mathematical model of the system to observe
failure modes, or outcomes from different scenarios. Used in industrial
systems, and in training.
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Aviation safety-committed culture is rooted in the following principles: (1) there is
no such thing as an error-free environment, (2) errors are mostly due to faulty systems
and system design, (3) reporting must stimulate error information sharing, (4) adverse
events are the “tip of the iceberg”, and (5) failure prevention must be a continuous effort
[73]. Aviation risk management strategy includes: continuous teamwork training (crew
resource management, CRM); standardizing error investigation, documentation and feed-
back; promoting the participation of all personnel in safety related endeavors; and using
data to guide changes and improvement initiatives.
There are several complementary sources of data related to aviation safety. Some
examples are observation of normal ﬂights, crew surveys and incident reporting. Non-
punitive incident reporting allows the identiﬁcation of error inducing conditions [72].
In aviation, incident reporting has been broadened to include near-misses in an effort to
identify latent failures and prevent their realization.
Gathering and analyzing reported near-misses focuses on learning from accidents or
events that did not happen, providing information on both the factors that triggered such
events and those that prevented them. Besides aviation, near-miss reporting and analysis
has been adopted by chemical and nuclear power plants. The Wharton School of Man-
agement [74] illustrates how accidents can be reduced with systematic near-miss analysis.
Near-misses are much more common than actual accidents, but are not easily observable,
so a well designed infrastructure for identifying and reporting near-misses, analyzing
them, and disseminating feedback is required. Such a structure must be conﬁdential and
non-punitive.
Aviation incident reporting is based on guidelines established by NASA’s Aviation
Safety Reporting System and the UK Conﬁdential Human Factors Incident Reporting
scheme (CHIRP). In this system, pilots and other crew members describe how adverse
event precursors are detected and mitigated. This information is then published in newslet-
ters and websites to inform staff of potential hazards [75]. Incident reports have led to
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improved maintenance and ﬂight operations as well as equipment redesign. Nevertheless,
since the nature of this reporting system is voluntary, there is not sufﬁcient information to
conﬁdently determine error rates [72].
The US Aviation Safety Reporting System consists of teams of trained coders who
analyze each reported incident. The analysis of approximately 30,000 reported incidents
is estimated to cost about $3 million annually (about $100 per case) [75]. Unfortunately,
the frequency of incidents in healthcare is expected to signiﬁcantly exceed aviation’s.
Estimates suggest that around one million serious errors occur each year [76]. This po-
tential massive amount of data collection makes the development and implementation of a
national reporting/analysis system costly and logistically difﬁcult to implement [75].
These observations tend to discourage development and implementation of similar
approaches in healthcare. Nevertheless, near-miss analysis is recommended by the IOM
to understand, monitor, and enhance mindfulness of the risks in the system. Near-miss
reporting has been introduced in some patient safety programs in hospitals, although
implementation has been slow and analysis has been limited. In general, healthcare risks
share many characteristics with other high risk industries but require consideration of the
particular attributes before attempting to implement seemingly successful models.
2.4 Risk Management in the Delivery of Healthcare
2.4.1 Risk and Patient Safety
Patients are exposed to two types of risks. The ﬁrst is the risk inherent to their medical
condition, i.e. the clinical risk. This risk encompasses the risk brought by the patient (risk
of the disease itself as well as co-morbid conditions) and the risk brought by the interven-
tion or treatment. Observing an actual adverse event related to this risk depends on the
development of the disease and on the appropriateness and effectiveness of treatments.
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The second is the risk of experiencing an adverse event due to unintended performance
of the healthcare delivery system, i.e. healthcare delivery risk, regardless of the medical
condition. This risk compromises patient safety and is the focus of this section.
Traditionally, patient safety has been conceived as a quality matter. The concept of
risk has been used in a delivery context to measure quality of care. For example, in acute
care hospitals, morbidity and mortality outcomes are studied by statistically removing the
effects of the patients’ clinical risk factors on the rates. In these so called risk-adjusted
outcome measures, the healthcare delivery process is a “black box”. Its quality is mea-
sured as the variation of the risk-adjusted outcomes [77–79].
Today, patient safety efforts are focusing more on understanding the “black box”,
and identifying sources of healthcare delivery risks. According to the JC [80], healthcare
delivery risks stem from failures in communication among patients, practitioners, and
staff; substandard patient management; and faulty performance before, during and after a
clinical intervention. Causes include organizational failures in areas such as management,
organizational culture, and protocols/processes (latent failures); technical failure, and
human error (active failures) [81]. Efforts to reduce risk should use some of the principles
of high reliability organizations (HRO’s) such as focus on identifying, understanding and
preventing failures and (or) their consequences on the system. HRO’s build and adapt
their processes based on “risk awareness and acknowledgement” [82]. Understanding
the system is fundamental to controlling risks. In the case of dynamic systems such as
healthcare, continuous monitoring of system behavior is vital to detect potentially induced
risks.
The 1999 IOM report presents several recommendations to enhance patient safety.
The establishment of safety programs in hospitals is one of them. As a result, some risk
analysis tools such as FMEA and RCA have gained popularity in the evaluation of risk in
healthcare systems and outcomes. Similarly, PRA and variations have been proposed in
patient safety research initiatives as an appropriate tool for the prospective analysis of risk
20
in healthcare delivery systems [28, 83]. However, the beneﬁts offered by these tools in
dynamic, complex, human-driven systems are not consistent over time so, an innovative
theoretical platform is needed [14].
A major concern of the IOM is the lack of safety data to use conventional analysis
techniques. Therefore, in 2004, an IOM committee presented a plan to develop patient
safety data standards [26]. The report describes the IOM’s vision of a national health
information infrastructure that integrates clinical information with patient safety data
to support decisions of providers and patients. The efforts of the federal government to
establish a system that guarantees continuity of healthcare data for military personnel
transitioning to the veteran’s affairs system are steps toward building that infrastructure
[84].
2.4.2 Patient Safety Data
Patient safety data include any piece of information that leads to the identiﬁcation
and measurement of failures in the healthcare delivery system that have the potential
to harm patients. Adverse events are the usual form of patient safety data because they
presumably evidence failure. However, as previously stated, patient safety data should
not necessarily be restricted to adverse events, since not all adverse events are caused by
failures in the system and not all failures in the system result in adverse events. Alter-
native forms of patient safety data include near-misses, compliance with safe practices,
and assessment of safety culture [9–12]. Preferred choice of data depends on the problem
or the intervention being evaluated [85] and on the “information infrastructure” of the
institution.
Current sources of patient safety data include: mandatory and voluntary incident re-
ports, RCA reports, morbidity and mortality cases, malpractice claims [86], chart reviews,
case reviews, direct observation, and patient administration system (PAS) surveillance
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[27]. Each source of patient safety data has its strengths and weaknesses. For example,
compared to other sources, chart review may identify a larger number of incidents [87].
On the other hand, direct observation helps identify errors (commission/omission) directly
related to human performance [88]. However, these methodologies are costly and time
consuming. For this reason, chart review and direct observation are mostly used in time-
limited or problem-speciﬁc studies [89]. It has been argued that different approaches lead
to the identiﬁcation of different types of incidents. It is recommended that several sources
of safety data are used [87]. Currently, incident reporting and retrospective identiﬁcation
of causes have become the typical approach to manage patient safety [7, 46].
The IOM emphasized the use and standardization of incident reports to assess and
improve safety [20, 26]. Most proposals of reporting systems found in the literature fo-
cus on actual errors [7, 90, 91] and only recent ones include near-miss reporting [9]. By
2008, twenty seven states had established mandatory reporting of adverse events [92, 93].
Florida [94] and New York [95] have used voluntary near-miss reporting systems to pro-
vide some feedback in the form of advisories. Some institutions have implemented inter-
nal, voluntary near-miss reporting systems [96]. Nevertheless, data structure, reliability
and analysis vary among states and institutions; the validity and sharing of information
remain a challenge.
The IOM stresses the relevance of reporting and analysis of near-misses for: mod-
eling, to understand how failures become near-misses or adverse events; trending, to
study/monitor the distribution of failure; and enhancing alertness when clear adverse
events have low frequency. However, most analyses focus on trending. There is the need
to develop models to support the analysis of near-misses, as well as other types of patient
safety data.
Since most reports consist of free text, their analysis is done by experts who review,
classify and code each report according to a taxonomy that allows for context-speciﬁc
interpretation [97–99]. Trend analysis of aggregate classiﬁed reports helps determine
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areas that require deeper investigation [87] and establish priorities through Pareto charts
[26]. Some authors have proposed enriching incident reports by linking them to electronic
medical records so that the analysis includes patient risk factors [100]. Bilimoria et al.
[101] propose an application that tracks previous occurrences of electronic reports, so that
the analysis pinpoints potential system problems.
Incident reports are also analyzed individually to identify root causes, similar to the
Aviation Safety Reporting System [102]. In the case of near-misses, RCA is believed to
lead to the identiﬁcation of potential adverse events and their causes [29, 73]. In general,
the identiﬁcation of causes leads to interventions, or system changes, aiming to improve
future outcomes. Additionally, individual near-miss analysis allows for the identiﬁcation
and understanding of effective recovery procedures. These (recovery strategies) help
strengthen general procedures, and develop tools to prevent/protect against failure [103].
However incident reporting alone does not sufﬁce to identify and prevent adverse events
[87, 89, 98] because of biases in the data, such as incompleteness and lack of timeliness,
embedded in reports [104].
The IOM patient safety research agenda includes the development of error/recovery
models and the integration of retrospective and prospective risk analysis techniques [26].
They recommend the use of visual models (cause-effect/Ishikawa) diagrams and process
ﬂow diagrams) to create a shared understanding of the system, enhance incident analysis,
and validate proposed solution approaches. Such models should allow for the use of avail-
able data to evaluate system performance and provide necessary information to providers
to deliver appropriate and safe services [105].
So far, we have presented the state of the art of current practices in healthcare risk
management as they relate to patient safety. In the process, we have identiﬁed several
opportunities for improvement in the way risks are currently identiﬁed, assessed and
monitored. These opportunities include the need for the identiﬁcation of system failures
versus human error, the lack structured and consistent data and/or analysis methods that
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are appropriate for the data that is available, the need for guidelines to select or develop
appropriate risk analysis models and methods that will lead to better understanding the
system and support decision making, and the need for a theoretical platform for con-
tinuous monitoring to detect potentially induced risks over time. In what follows, we
present the results of our review of the literature on model-based approaches in healthcare
systems to understand and control risks that compromise patient safety.
2.4.3 Models for Risk in the Delivery of Healthcare
Valid visual models provide the basis for the development of back-end analyses that
are able to represent the behavior of the system in terms of its critical variables. The most
commonly used model in patient safety is the Swiss cheese model proposed by Reason
(1990). This model provides a basic representation of the behavior of system failures,
and has become the foundation of most risk analysis approaches [44]. There are several
models that have been proposed to characterize safety in all types of industries, and have
become the foundation of safety theory [14, 106]. Still, the use of such models in health-
care initiatives has been limited. There is the need to advance healthcare beyond other
industrial settings that are concerned with the development and application of formal
models to understand, monitor and make decisions related to safety.
Models are relevant in the implementation and evaluation of proposed solutions or
interventions. Nevertheless, the actual use of models for systematic analysis in patient
safety management is scarce. The literature presents some isolated instances of proposals
and/or applications of models that address risk, or safety, in the delivery of healthcare.
The models are rooted in theories of system dynamics, reliability, (occupational) safety,
and quality control.
Carayon et al. [71] proposes a model of the healthcare delivery system that includes
patient safety. The Systems Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model char-
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acterizes system components and their interactions to identify their potential effects on
patients, healthcare workers and the healthcare organization. The model is built upon
concepts from human factors, systems engineering and well-known healthcare quality
models to facilitate the understanding of the system and risks that compromise patient
safety.
Cook and Rasmussen [107] present a system dynamics model that illustrates how
congestion in a surgical intensive care unit (ICU) causes other hospital units to alter their
operations by delaying transfers and changing operational plans, thus jeopardizing patient
safety. Lee et al. [108] proposes the use of causal loop diagrams from system dynamics
as an alternative to ﬂowcharts to represent and analyze adverse events. Similarly, Cooke
and Rohleder [32] use system dynamics to illustrate their proposed learning approach
to enhance safety in organizations. The author models risk as a hidden system that is
parallel to the service system, and has its own outcomes. System dynamics has been used
in healthcare systems analysis to identify bottlenecks and improve ﬂow [109] since some
believe that it provides sound methods to address the “dynamic complexity of health sys-
tems” [108]. Nevertheless, system dynamics based models have had limited application in
patient safety.
Effken et al. [110, 111] propose the use of simulation to model the performance of
a healthcare service delivery unit, and evaluate strategies to improve outcomes (quality
and safety). The authors build a causal model of the impact of patient, unit and organi-
zation’s characteristics in outcomes (medication errors and falls). Then, they develop the
simulation model using a tool (OrgAhead) that was originally created to analyze organi-
zational behavior, and that considers decision making and learning. Currently the model
is undergoing additional revisions. Systems simulation applications in healthcare delivery
have mainly focused on patient ﬂow and capacity analyses. Applications in patient safety
are scarce because of the difﬁculty in modeling and validating variables related to human
behavior.
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Dhillon [112] proposes to apply traditional reliability models to healthcare systems,
deﬁning failures as errors. He deﬁnes the “reliability” of a healthcare professional as
his/her probability of not committing an error. A known statistical distribution for the
time-to-err is assumed, to conventionally estimate the reliability. The author also illus-
trates the potential use of Markov models to estimate this reliability, as well as the re-
liability of the delivery system. Likewise, Pate-Cornell et al. [113, 114] use a Markov
process for the analysis of risks in an anesthesia delivery system. The states of the process
are determined by the states of the anesthesia system (resources, providers) and the pa-
tient responses. The measure of interest is the limiting probability of reaching one of the
limiting states: brain-damage/death or recovered-patient. The model is used to evaluate
the effect of organizational factors on the state transition rates and hence on the limiting
probabilities. The results of the corresponding analysis are used to support the evaluation
and prioritization of strategies to prevent anesthesia adverse events.
Pradhan et al. [115] show how to use sequence diagrams to model information ﬂow in
healthcare processes and identify potentially risky activities or interactions. The authors
then estimate the probability of failure in patient care episodes assuming that processes
within are independent of each other and using reliability of serial systems models. They
also use utility theory to estimate an expected value for the effects of failures in patient
care episodes.
Ekaette et al. [116] proposes the use of probabilistic trees to analyze a radiation treat-
ment delivery system. After careful study and analysis of the system, the authors iden-
tiﬁed potential accident scenarios, and determined causal relations. Probabilities were
assigned using expert knowledge. The authors show that probabilistic tree analysis is as
useful as incident reporting to identify system vulnerabilities.
Cooper and Lipsitch [117] proposes to analyze hospital infection data through Hidden
Markov Models (HMM). The author proposes a model of the “mechanistic” dynamics of
the transmission process as the hidden process and to use available infection data as ob-
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served outcomes needed to estimate the model parameters. In this case, the model is easy
to understand and interpret given knowledge about the infection transmission process. On
the other hand, Benneyan et al. [118] propose the use of statistical process control (SPC)
to monitor the occurrence of infections and other rare incidents. The authors propose a
new type of SPC chart that better ﬁts this purpose. SPC tools have been used in healthcare
delivery to monitor outcomes such as infections, surgical complications, and patient falls.
SPC tools are useful to monitor “sporadic” (random) outcomes that are measurable and
provide complete data [99]. For the case of “systematic” outcomes, models that account
for the dynamics of the system are needed.
Some authors have developed conceptual models to understand the dynamics of the
delivery system of their interest. For example, Veazie [119] proposes a model for the
individual decision making process of a healthcare professional under constraints of in-
formation (availability) and uncertainty of patient responses. The author deﬁnes four
components in the decision making process: decision environment, problem space, ac-
tion space, and goal space. Healthcare professionals relate the needs of the patient with
each one of the model components. He assumes the existence of “appropriate” criteria
for matching patient needs and deﬁnes an error as the non-correspondence of identiﬁed
vs. appropriate criteria. The main purpose of this model is to provide a framework for
intervening decision making behavior that leads to adverse outcomes. Chuang et al. [120]
present a conceptual model for learning from adverse events, based on theories of organi-
zational learning. The authors divide learning into: individual (perceived characteristics
of the failure), group (experiences and leadership), and institutional learning (safety man-
agement). They identify speciﬁc factors that hinder or facilitate learning at each of these
levels. The model provides a framework to identify strategies to improve learning and
prevent reoccurrence of failures.
Quantitative modeling is scarce in patient safety because traditional tools assume the
existence of data needed to estimate model parameters, such as the case of the models
27
proposed by Dhillon [112]. Actually implementing these types of models requires ex-
ploration of all possible sources of data, including the assessment of experts [113, 114].
Nevertheless, experts’ assessment is believed to underestimate actual risks [116]. In gen-
eral, conceptual models seem to be the most common approach to understanding systems
and their risks.
So far, we have reviewed how safety is addressed in healthcare, and in other industries
that have been compared to healthcare such as aviation. We have also explored the litera-
ture to ﬁnd alternative model-based approaches to (patient) safety-related problems. In the
next section, we present a summary of the speciﬁc characteristics that we identiﬁed are
needed in models of risk in healthcare delivery systems, and that deﬁne a research area
within healthcare systems engineering.
2.5 Discussion
Many organizations have recognized the importance of understanding their systems
before improving them [115]. For example, aviation implemented CRM as a result of
ﬁnding that teamwork skills and the capacity of managing unknown situations are critical
to prevent catastrophic consequences of accidents. In the case of healthcare, processes,
operational risks and their sources must be understood and monitored to enhance patient
safety. Moreover there is a need to comprehend the impact that changes may have on
both, the performance of the healthcare delivery system and its risks to support decision
making. This objective can be achieved through the development of models [121] that
explicitly consider risk sources, are kept up to date, and are developed in collaboration
with managers, providers, patients and researchers.
Developing a model challenges our knowledge about the system and boosts our un-
derstanding of it [122] which in turn, strengthens the validity and robustness of the mod-
els developed (see ﬁgure 2.1). However, modeling healthcare delivery is complex due to
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Figure 2.1: The modeling cycle
the presence of human behavior, organizational structures, hierarchy among providers,
limited communication protocols, resistance to change, and the unavailability of data.
Nevertheless, modeling tools such as statistical process control, queuing theory and sim-
ulation have been adapted and used in the improvement of healthcare operations [118,
123]. Still, models of risk actually used to support patient safety enhancement efforts are
scarce.
Traditionally, patient safety initiatives are the result of post-incident investigations
and focus on localized areas, although a systems approach has been strongly encour-
aged [26, 123]. System models provide an overall perspective that helps visualize and
communicate how different sub-systems interact and impact each other, as well as the
system itself [107]. These models can assist in the selection of proposed solutions by
explicitly determining safety needs and identifying characteristics that may facilitate or
hinder the success of patient safety interventions. For example, while human behavior
introduces variability and makes the system vulnerable to failure, it also brings ﬂexibility
and learning capacity that allows the system to be proactive in the presence of unexpected
situations. Models can also aid in monitoring deviations from expected performance of
implemented solutions. Rasmussen’s dynamic safety model locates systems performance
in a space delimited by boundaries of unacceptable performance i.e. feasible operat-
ing space [107]. There is the opportunity to mathematically deﬁne this space to moni-
tor the performance of a system in terms of its location within the space relative to such
boundaries. Depending on the objective and level of speciﬁcity required, modeling tools
range from diagrammatic system descriptions [121] to complex mathematical models.
Regardless of the tool chosen, a model for risk in the delivery of care must represent the
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Table 2.3: Considerations for risk models to enhance patient safety
Models to support patient safety should:
• Characterize potential risk sources
• Be dynamic
• Allow for proactive identiﬁcation and assessment of risks
• Include quantitative risks measures that are relevant to the system
and understandable to users
• Use different sources of patient safety data available
• Identify and assess biases in patient safety data
• Support the enhancement of risk awareness
• Be scalable
system and its risks to the extent that is deemed adequate by stakeholders [124]. Models
should be simple and intuitive such that they are understood, accepted and used as tools in
managing patient safety [125]. Box 1 presents a summary of challenging considerations
for models that support patient safety to be useful in improving care.
As proposed by Cooke and Rohleder [32], and supported in different ways by safety
theorists [14, 47, 106], incidents are due to the substandard performance, or failure, of
speciﬁc system components, or their interactions. The explicit characterization of poten-
tial sources of risk facilitates the analysis of patient safety data. In addition, this char-
acterization allows for the development of formal models that represent the behavior
of such sources and their effect on risk. For example, Leveson proposes to use safety
constraints and system controls as sources of risk. In healthcare systems, patient safety
interventions play a similar role to safety constraints since they are implemented to reduce
the probability of speciﬁc adverse events [126]. To some extent the literature discusses
the suitability of evidence of the effectiveness of patient safety interventions [127, 128].
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We argue that models need to be developed models to evaluate the performance of patient
safety interventions within speciﬁc systems. These models will help answer the question
of effectiveness by identifying both, generalizable factors to deﬁne implementation guide-
lines, and factors speciﬁc to each particular organization that should be studied to ensure
success. System dynamics and stochastic models of the possible states of each interven-
tion could provide insight into the potential realization of undesirable scenarios. Still,
these types of models should be adapted to consider characteristics that are particular to
healthcare.
Healthcare systems are dynamic in nature due to the constant evolution of diseases,
medical knowledge, technology, and human factors [97]. Thus modeling, monitoring,
evaluating and improving the system should be dynamic as well. Otherwise, the emer-
gence of new risks will soon render models and their solutions obsolete and inefﬁcient.
For example, adverse drug events related to illegible prescriptions are expected to be
abolished with the implementation of computerized physician order entry (CPOE). Al-
though this solution will likely eliminate errors due to illegibility, new hazards related to
the new technology may arise. Such is the case of users forgetting to save data, ignoring
reminders, and duplication of information, among others [129]. Hence, it is necessary that
risks are identiﬁed and evaluated over time and that the possibility for new risks be made
explicit in the corresponding models. For example, a particular state of a risk source may
be deﬁned as “undeﬁned state” and patient safety data that are not clearly linked to known
states may be assigned to this state to reﬂect lack of knowledge about the corresponding
source and the need for further assessment.
The dynamic nature of healthcare delivery also demands proactive identiﬁcation and
assessment of its risks. Although the evaluation of past incidents may help understand the
possible consequences of speciﬁc hazards, the prevention of future incidents is better ap-
proached by “foreseeing” potential failures. The timely identiﬁcation and intervention of
processes in need of improvement, or susceptible to serious consequences, will reduce the
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probability of failure [115]. For example, the reporting and analysis of near-misses offers
the opportunity to identify potential failures before suffering adverse consequences [26].
Such is the case of the “no-fault medical-event reporting system for transfusion medicine”
(MERS-TM) in a Toronto, Canada teaching hospital, which helped identify different
risks through near-misses reported and their analysis resulted in a dramatic reduction of
the frequency and severity of reported events [10]. This type of system also allows for
dynamic risk monitoring because the evidence of new risks will surface as related near-
misses are reported.
The identiﬁcation of potential risk sources should include a quantitative measure
[130]. Qualitative analysis is still necessary because available patient safety data con-
sist mainly of medical charts and narrative reports. However, systematic, quantitative
risk assessment allows for prioritization of strategies and solutions, aids in the deﬁnition
of target performance, and guides the monitoring of improvement over time [82, 131].
Additionally, deﬁned risk measure(s) must be relevant to the system and meaningful to
users [132] and should also permit prospective risk analysis. For example, an updated
probability of an adverse event can be interpreted by users and could be estimated prior to
the occurrence of accidents, using information from near-misses [43]. Also this measure
could be translated into potential accidents during the next period or into potential litiga-
tion costs. Still, patient safety data has some limitations that hinder its use to statistically
assess probability distributions. So we should use the subjective interpretation of prob-
ability [133] as a measure of the uncertainty about risk that is determined by the state of
knowledge about the performance of risk sources.
It is important to keep in mind that different sources of patient safety data provide
valuable information about risks in the system [87]. Studies on patient safety data sources
suggest that there is potential value in assessing risk, although their use will require metic-
ulous preprocessing [89, 134]. Some of these data have biases since they are generated by
people and may be incomplete, inaccurate or untimely. Risk models should use available
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data sources, recognizing their biases, to update knowledge about the system and ﬂag
potential breakdowns. For example, Pate-Cornell et al. [114] considers biases in incident
reports by applying an “underreporting factor” to estimate the probability of anesthesia
adverse events obtained from the Australian Incident Monitoring System (AIMS). On
the other hand, Cooper and Lipsitch’s model for the analysis of hospital acquired in-
fections provides insight into the transmission process, while using common hospital
administrative data to update parameter values that can signal elevated risk of infection
[117]. Traditional analysis methods such as FMEA and RCA may be used to pre-process
patient safety data before using it in actual models. For example, RCA may be used to
identify actual links between observed outcomes and risk sources. The use of existing
qualitative risk analysis methodologies facilitates the understanding of procedures to
build, implement and update models.
One of the main objectives of patient safety initiatives should be to enhance risk aware-
ness to reinforce proactive decision making, which in turn should minimize errors and
their adverse consequences [26]. In most healthcare settings, the low frequency of adverse
events requires that providers be informed or reminded of the risks in the system and
their mitigating strategies [32]. The Florida Patient Safety Corporation [94] used public
advisories to enhance awareness on signiﬁcant risks identiﬁed through their state near-
miss and adverse event reporting systems. Timely feedback on the performance of risk
sources, such as potentially faulty patient safety interventions, will provide healthcare
workers with information to appropriately react to otherwise unexpected failures.
Finally, models developed as a tool to manage and improve patient safety should be
scalable. As a system grows or our understating of it expands, the model should be able
to grow as well. For example, graph-based models that represent the links among risk
sources, potential adverse events, and types of patient safety data can grow -by adding
nodes and edges– as new components are identiﬁed with experience. Similarly, simula-
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tion models also exemplify possible scalable models, since they can be adapted to include
new subsystems or new interactions between existing systems.
Figure 2.2: Risk model building blocks
Patient safety management should be equipped with an analytic framework to support
the analysis of performance of healthcare systems [123], using available sources of data,
to identify and track risks [26]. Figure 2.2 depicts the desirable components of the health-
care risk model outlined in this section. Dotted lines represent the dynamic interaction
between components. We highlight that systems and risk analysis should be designed and
carried out with the aim that their conclusions can be used to develop models that support
risk management and decision making, rather than to make a single decision and be ﬁled.
Therefore, new models should be developed that are capable of capturing the outputs of
existing risk analysis methods, such as FMEA and RCA. Alternatively, these qualitative
methodologies may be adapted, or new ones developed, so that their outputs can be useful
in engineering modeling endeavors. Similarly, there is the need to deﬁne appropriate
methods to process patient safety data to be usable in the desired model. Information
from patient safety data can be actively used to update measures of risk, or to identify the
need to reassess parameters obtained from qualitative risk analysis.
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In addition, mapping an abstract concept, such as risk, to real system components or
interactions requires the identiﬁcation of such components whose behavior affect out-
comes that are directly related to risk, i.e., risk sources. There is the need for research
on the identiﬁcation of such components, or their classes. Then, there is the need to de-
termine which observable outcomes could be used as markers of their performance, and
what is the relation among these components, the corresponding outcomes, and uncom-
mon, but potentially undesirable, events that should be avoided. These types of models
can also incorporate broader recommendations speciﬁc to each risk source, such as “in-
vestigation needed” or “further data of a particular type should be collected”.
Working with concepts commonly used in healthcare risk analysis will guarantee that
the resulting model will have a user-friendly front-end that is understandable to users
and stakeholders, while serving as the core of a decision support model to evaluate and
prioritize potential solutions.
2.6 Conclusions
Current estimates of adverse events suggest that healthcare services add some risk to
the already vulnerable condition of patients. Consequently, hospital accreditation require-
ments now include the establishment of institutional patient safety programs. These pro-
grams address patient safety mainly through qualitative analysis of available patient safety
data, and the implementation of interventions. In this paper we provided an overview of
patient safety, common methodologies used by healthcare organizations, and alternative
approaches proposed by researchers in the area. In addition, we identiﬁed challenges and
opportunities to enhance patient safety management efforts through modeling.
Particular characteristics of healthcare systems, and patient safety data, make tra-
ditional statistical methods unsuitable to assess risk, determine lasting solutions, and
monitor system performance in terms of safety. In addition, the development of models
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to support patient safety management has been hindered by the lack of understanding of
risk in healthcare delivery systems. The literature presents some applications that address
different patient safety-related situations through modeling and analysis. Although lim-
ited in number, they follow the recommendations of the IOM and NAE to use engineering
based tools to understand and improve care delivery. Still, there is the need for modeling
to understand risks in the delivery of care and how it is affected by interactions and per-
formance of subsystems.
Modeling risk in the healthcare delivery can shed light on aspects in need of imme-
diate attention and assist in the evaluation and selection of potential solutions. These
models should explicitly characterize sources of risk, to facilitate analysis and feedback,
be dynamic to reﬂect the changing nature of the service, have a prospective component
to prevent adverse outcomes and support proactive decision making, have a quantitative
component to allow monitoring and evaluation, and use available patient safety data to
continuously update our knowledge about the system. To achieve a model with these
characteristics, concepts and tools from different disciplines must be combined and adapted.
For example, the deﬁnition of sources of risk requires understanding of the perfor-
mance of these system components and their impact on the performance of the healthcare
system as a whole. In the example of patient safety interventions as sources of risk, the
literature focuses mostly on establishing evidence of their global effectiveness [127, 128].
Still, the performance of interventions will depend on the system in which they are im-
plemented. Therefore, there is the need to deﬁne guidelines to evaluate and monitor the
performance of risk sources in particular settings.
These considerations conﬁrm the need for formal research in modeling risk in health-
care delivery and its potential value to patient safety and quality of care.
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Chapter 3: Clustering-Based Methodology for Analyzing Near-Miss Reports and
Identifying Risks in Healthcare Delivery
3.1 Introduction
According to the HealthGrades Seventh Annual Patient Safety in American Hospitals
Study, one million patient-safety incidents occurred from 2006 to 2008 among Medicare
patients. One in ten patients that experienced a patient-safety incident subsequently died.
Costs related were estimated to be $8.9 billion [1]. The report notes that according to the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, there are 40,000 harm-related events daily [2].
Most hospitals have some mechanism for reporting incidents to identify related risks
and prevent their reoccurrence. Incident reports mostly consist of free text or narrative.
These reports are analyzed by being classiﬁed into a pre-speciﬁed classiﬁcation system
that allows tabulating and aggregating events according to the predeﬁned attributes. This
type of analysis leads to prioritization of safety initiatives, and allocation of interventions
to sources of risk related to the most frequent attributes. Classifying is a limited approach
since some of the most devastating accidents have been the result of risks identiﬁed only
in hindsight. Attributes that characterize different components of an incident generally
point to well-known (potential) risk areas, so analysts can identify only obvious relations
among incidents.
The Institute of Medicine strongly encourages reporting and analysis of near-misses
since they can point out risk without patients being harmed. Near-misses are incidents
that could have caused harm but did not [41]. They are believed to be indicators of areas
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of increased risk. They are also much more frequent than adverse events, offering advan-
tages for risk identiﬁcation and analysis [26].
This research is focused on developing a methodology to support the gathering and
analysis of near-miss reports. It proposes a taxonomy to code near-misses and an unsuper-
vised clustering methodology to process such reports and guide further risk analysis. The
outcome of this methodology is a rank of groups of reports that may lead to the identiﬁca-
tion of obvious, as well as potentially hidden, sources of risk. The proposed methodology
is applicable to different (preferred) classiﬁcation systems and can be automated into a
risk management information system.
The next section introduces concepts related to near-misses and their analysis, in-
cluding existing taxonomies for their classiﬁcation. Section 3.3 introduces the proposed
methodology to analyze near-miss reports and the proposed taxonomy for near-misses.
Section 3.4 explains clustering of near-miss reports. Section 3.5 presents suggestions for
risk analysis using near-miss clusters and illustrates the output of the clustering method-
ology using simulated data. Section 3.6 presents some comments on the validity of our
approach, and conclusions and future work are discussed in Section 3.7
3.2 Near-Miss Analysis
“Near-miss” is a term borrowed from aviation that denotes an adverse event that did
not occur because of the intervention of an individual or by a fortunate evolution of the
circumstances. It refers to incidents that did not result in harm. They are believed to be
precursors of adverse events [60] and thus share the same causal continuum [43] as doc-
umented in chemical [12] and transportation safety research [26, 60, 80]. They allow for
analysis of risks before consequences are observed and are more frequent than adverse
events (7-100 times more frequent [26]).
38
The use of near-miss reports has disadvantages typical of incident reporting systems
[98, 135–138]. Therefore, it requires a reporting infrastructure that is simple, conﬁdential
and non-punitive. The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (Public Law
109-41), was enacted to address reporting barriers [98]. Still, incident reports constitute a
non-random sample of an unknown population at risk; therefore, simple rates of reported
incidents are not proper metrics to monitor safety. There is a need for the development of
more suitable methods to analyze incident reports [75].
3.2.1 Incident Reporting and Analysis
Incident reporting is relevant to health care delivery because risks related to human
behavior are intangible. In such situations, systematic reporting and analysis helps to
identify weaknesses in the system before accidents occur. However, expertise and thor-
ough analysis are required to identify system risk [60].
Most incident reporting systems consist of free text. Therefore, their analysis is gen-
erally done by experts who review, classify and code each report according to a taxonomy
that allows for context-speciﬁc interpretation [97–99]. Analysis of aggregate classiﬁed re-
ports helps determine areas that require deeper investigation [87] and establish priorities.
Some authors have proposed enriching incident reports by linking them to electronic med-
ical records so the analysis includes patient risk factors [100, 101]. Incident reports are
also analyzed individually to identify root causes, similar to the Aviation Safety Reporting
System [102]. In the case of near-misses, root cause analysis (RCA) is believed to lead
to the identiﬁcation of potential adverse events and their causes [29, 73], although their
generalization requires consistency of risk throughout the different processes within and
around the delivery system [139].
Health care is attempting to replicate the incident reporting and analysis model of
aviation. The US Aviation Safety Reporting System consists of teams of trained coders
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who analyze each reported incident. Unfortunately, estimates suggest that around one
million serious errors occur each year in healthcare delivery systems [76], which signif-
icantly exceeds the frequency of incidents in aviation and makes the development and
implementation of a national reporting/analysis system costly and logistically difﬁcult to
implement [75]. Nevertheless, near-miss reporting has been introduced in some patient
safety programs in hospitals [95, 96]. Still, implementation has been rather slow because
of reporting barriers and limited analyses [9, 92, 93, 95].
3.2.2 Incident Classiﬁcation Systems
An effective classiﬁcation is needed to systematically detect and analyze patient safety
events. Classiﬁcation systems for errors and near-misses can be found addressing speciﬁc
areas of health care [140]. Most taxonomies deal with hospital based incidents, but there
are a number of studies that propose classiﬁcation systems for primary care [141].
The following is a summary of classiﬁcation systems found in the literature. The
National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC
MERP) published a taxonomy of medication errors in 1998 [140]. Wilson et al. [142]
developed a generic taxonomy in 1999, from an analysis of the adverse events presented
in a study of the quality of Australian health care published in 1995. Dovey et al. [143]
proposed a preliminary taxonomy for error in family medicine in 2002. Rubin et al. pre-
sented their classiﬁcation of errors in health care in 2003 [144] which was used in 2006
by Steele [145] in primary optometric care with satisfying results. In 2004, Zhang et
al. [146] proposed and evaluated a cognitive taxonomy of medical errors to understand
and potentially predict them. In 2005, Woods et al. [147] presented a system to clas-
sify patient safety events. In 2002, Makeham et al. described the international taxonomy
developed by the Primary Care International Study of Medical Errors (PCISME), and
intended to describe errors reported in Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
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the United Kingdom and the United States. This taxonomy was re-evaluated by Jacobs et
al. in 2007 [148], who concluded that it is not suitable for Canadian data, and proposed a
new classiﬁcation system for errors in family medicine.
In 2003, The World Health Organization (WHO) set out to develop the International
Patient Safety Event Taxonomy, intended to be adaptable and consistent across the con-
tinuum of health care and around the world. This taxonomy is being empirically vali-
dated [149]. In 2005, the Joint Commission (JC, formerly known as JCAHO) published
a taxonomy for near misses and adverse events based upon previous studies available
in the literature [80]. The whole taxonomy has over 200 subcategories and is endorsed
by the National Quality Forum as a standard for safety data sharing and analysis across
health care [81, 150]. In 2010, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
released common formats for reporting patient safety data [151, 152]. These formats
consist of requirements and speciﬁcations to facilitate the collection, aggregation and
analysis of incident reports. The main goal is that such incidents be submitted to Patient
Safety Organizations (PSOs) and shared through a network of patient safety databases
(NPSD). Although analysis methodologies and their outputs are yet to be deﬁned, the
agency expects that establishing a common language and deﬁnitions for safety events will
lead to better analysis of patient safety events.
In the United States, the JC patient safety event taxonomy is considered an important
guideline for safety analysts and researchers; however, there is no ofﬁcial taxonomy.
Institutions classify and analyze incidents following general recommendations, or state
regulations, but still according to their own preferences. Our research focuses on support-
ing risk analysts in their quest to ﬁnd sources of risk. Information technology and data
mining techniques are used to systematically organize current knowledge about system
risk and analyze near-miss reports using the preferred taxonomy.
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3.3 Methodology to Analyze Near-Miss Reports
We propose the use of unsupervised clustering techniques to analyze near-miss reports
and facilitate subsequent risk analysis. Our proposed methodology is supported by a risk
database that stores previous knowledge about risks in the system. The methodology
consists of:
1. Systematic reporting of near-misses based on a taxonomy that facilitates both re-
porting and initial processing of reports.
2. Identiﬁcation of clusters of near-miss reports to be considered together in risk anal-
ysis.
3. Determination of the validity of clusters as indicators of system risk. Valid clus-
ters will be preserved in the database for analysis of future incidents, so new near-
misses can be assigned to existing “valid” clusters or form new clusters.
Figure 3.1: Methodology to analyze near-miss reports
The methodology is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Shaded blocks represent steps in the
analysis that require human input, such as risk analysis and accepting or rejecting the va-
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lidity of clusters found by the system. The proposed methodology supports risk analysis
by organizing and allocating previous knowledge about system risk. Basically, new near-
misses reported will be assigned to both a code deﬁned by the preferred taxonomy and
a cluster deﬁned by patterns within reports in a period of interest. Since it is important
to identify all potentially risky interactions in the system, it is not required that resulting
clusters of near-misses identiﬁed be mutually exclusive. Near-misses assigned to previ-
ously existing valid clusters can also be assigned to new clusters to ﬁnd new potential
risks.
We assume that there is no initial information about risk in the system. However, if
there are areas of interest represented by a combination of codes in the taxonomy, i.e., a
particular activity such as patient discharge, clusters formed by near-misses related to pa-
tient discharge activities can be initially determined as valid. The proposed methodology
is intended to ﬁnd (and rank) risk sources. We characterize risk sources as combinations
of categorical values of the different attributes of the near-miss that co-occur frequently.
In order to develop and implement this analysis methodology, a coding scheme for
near-misses is needed. We propose a taxonomy structure based on subsets of the JC pa-
tient safety event taxonomy, but simpler since it will be adapted to the speciﬁc setting
where it will be used. This structure is recommended for institutions that do not currently
have a coding scheme for reporting and plan to develop their own. The overall analysis
methodology can be implemented using any taxonomy for reporting, as long as one is
used.
3.3.1 Proposed Taxonomy for Near-Misses in Outpatient Settings
Since a taxonomy is required for a real-time near-miss reporting system, it should be
as simple as possible while as comprehensive as possible. We conducted brainstorming
sessions with nurses, AHP (Allied Health Practitioners), LIP (Licensed Independent Prac-
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titioner), physicians and other medical staff, from 13 outpatient clinics at the University
of South Florida, including ambulatory surgery, dermatology, family medicine, geriatrics,
gynecology, internal medicine and gastroenterology, obstetrics, ophthalmology, pediatrics,
psychiatry, surgery, radiology and chemotherapy. During these sessions, we obtained
a total of 667 near-misses. First, we analyzed these near-misses to ﬁnd duplicates, and
identiﬁed 386 unique event types. These unique near-misses were analyzed by a multidis-
ciplinary team, who identiﬁed 4 dimensions that could be used to describe them. These
dimensions were mainly derived from the JC patient safety event taxonomy [80].
Each classiﬁed near-miss report is intended to provide standard characteristics of the
encounter and of the attributes perceived by the reporter to have had the most signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on the corresponding near-miss. If an event is identiﬁed as the result of a se-
quence or the combination of several signiﬁcant failures, we recommend that multiple
near-miss reports be submitted, so that their attributes can be included in further analysis.
This speciﬁc taxonomy was developed for near-misses in outpatient clinics; so, the lowest
level categories are speciﬁc to outpatient settings. Nevertheless, the overall structure is
adaptable to any setting.
Figure 3.2: Dimensions of the taxonomy
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Information about the characteristics of the encounter is intended to be pulled directly
from the electronic health record system of the institution. Therefore, it is as comprehen-
sive as the information system of the institution allows. For the case of the outpatient
clinics, we propose to include: the clinic or location, the service or procedure according
to the codiﬁcation available, the staff member involved, and demographic information
about the patient (age, gender, coexisting conditions, race/ethnicity and socio-economic
status). Actual categories and subcategories depend on the setting and its information
infrastructure.
Information about the characteristics of the near-miss is intended to be reported by the
staff member who experienced and/or noticed the event. We propose that the near-miss
is characterized by three main dimensions, each one corresponding to an attribute of the
event. These are: activity type, focus of near-miss and error cause.
The activity type corresponds to the activity that was in process when the event oc-
curred. In our taxonomy for near-misses in outpatient settings, the main categories for
activity type are: information management, patient management, medical test/procedure
and resource management. Each one of these categories has sub-categories that can be
further subdivided as needed (Figure 3.3).
The focus of the near-miss is the deﬁning characteristic of the near-miss. It is related
to the incident and the potential consequences that were not actually experienced. The
categories of this attribute include: equipment/supplies, medication use, patient speciﬁc,
safety in the workplace, socio-economic based and test/procedure related. Subcategories
and detail are shown in Figure 3.4.
The error cause attempts to identify what type of breakdown caused the error. In our
taxonomy, categories include: human factor, organizational factor and technical mechani-
cal factor. Subcategories and detail are shown in Figure 3.5.
As previously mentioned, the proposed taxonomy structure is applicable to any set-
ting. In fact, the research team has started to adapt this taxonomy to an inpatient setting.
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Figure 3.3: Categories and subcategories for “Activity Type”
Some categories, sub-categories and detail had to be added to each of the dimensions and
some terms had to be revised. Nevertheless, the structure of the taxonomy remained as
having three dimensions to describe the near-miss.
3.3.1.1 Developing a Taxonomy for Near-Misses in a Particular Setting
The proposed taxonomy structure has four dimensions intended to be preserved re-
gardless of the setting where it will be utilized, while categories and subcategories should
arise from the speciﬁc characteristics of the setting. Brainstorming was used to form the
taxonomy and to assign initial values of severity to each dimension of the taxonomy. The
steps follow:
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Figure 3.4: Categories and subcategories for “Focus of Near-Miss”
1. Initialize each dimension of the taxonomy with basic categories from the JC Patient
Safety Event Taxonomy that are deemed applicable to the setting. This will form
the initial near-miss taxonomy.
2. Carry out a brainstorming session about near-misses with the participation of sev-
eral types of health care workers. The nominal group process is used to elicit spon-
taneous reporting of near-miss events experienced or witnessed by the individual
participants. The resulting list of near-misses will be called “potential near-misses”.
3. Record the severity of the potential near-misses following an agreed upon scale. We
used a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) scale.
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Figure 3.5: Categories and subcategories for “Error Cause”
4. Classify potential near-misses using the initial near-miss taxonomy (from step 1).
Iterate until all potential near-misses are assigned to a combination of categories
and subcategories in each dimension, as follows:
(a) Create a new category or subcategory for potential near-misses classiﬁed as
“other” in any dimension.
(b) Re-evaluate potential near-misses to check if they correspond to a newly cre-
ated category.
(c) Re-evaluate categories in each dimension to merge similar categories.
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5. For each code in the taxonomy, calculate the following severity indicators based on
the scores of the potential near-misses assigned to the code:
Most likely Severity: severity that repeats the most among the corresponding near-
misses [153].
Severity of worst case scenario: worst severity score of the corresponding near-
misses (corresponds to the minimum value in our scoring system).
The severity indicators will be stored in a risk database (see Figure 3.6) and used later
when analyzing near-misses reported into a system based on this taxonomy. They will
also be updated as new near-miss data arise and are analyzed.
3.3.2 Risk Database
A simple risk database should be kept, so new near-misses can be related to prior
occurrences or current risk information. This database can also be used to manage risk
and their corresponding recommended actions. See Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: Simple risk database
For the purpose of the Hazard analysis, the near-miss table is ﬁltered by cluster ac-
cording to the ranking, and near-misses are sorted according to their codes considering
item-sets ﬁrst.
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3.4 Clustering Near-Miss Reports
Clustering is a data mining methodology that consists of grouping similar data into
"clusters". In our application, a cluster is deﬁned as a set of near-misses that are closely
related to each other, and less related to near-misses outside the cluster. Near-miss clus-
ters should also have a set of categorical values that will characterize the source of risk
related to the cluster. We are interested in ﬁnding at least one signiﬁcant cluster according
to some risk deﬁning criteria.
Our proposed methodology consists of clustering near-miss data, characterizing the
resulting clusters and ranking them according to some risk deﬁning criteria. This method-
ology will be explained in detail in section 3.4.3. We will ﬁrst describe the data and intro-
duce concepts from data mining relevant to this application.
3.4.1 Near-Miss Data
The ﬁrst part of the research consisted of deﬁning an appropriate structure for the
reporting of near-misses that allows timely analysis of data. The proposed taxonomy for
near-misses deﬁnes the shape of incident reports. Reports are characterized by all compo-
nents in the taxonomy; for each dimension we will include the category, sub-category and
detail. Therefore, we have more attributes in the data set than the actual dimensions of the
taxonomy. This will facilitate further analysis of similarities between near-miss reports.
As seen in table 3.1, the near-miss reports dataset is formed by objects characterized
by 18 attributes. Most of these attributes are categorical-nominal, but there are still nu-
merical attributes such as age of the patient or date and time of the event, which make the
dataset mixed. The reporting system is in principle voluntary; therefore, observations are
not a random sample of events that actually take place in the institution. Hence, inference
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Table 3.1: Near-miss report structure
Column
Num-
ber
Column
Name
Original
Attribute
Description Attribute
Type
Bounds
/ No of
cate-
gories
0 EIN EIN Encounter Identiﬁcation Number Key
1 Date Date Number of days since Jan 00-00 Numerical [0, inf]
2 time Time % of day Numerical [0,1]
3 Set1 Setting Setting Category Categorical 3
4 Set2 Setting Detail Categorical 13
5 Serv Service Service Category Code Categorical 3
6 Comp Complexity Service Complexity Code Categorical 15
7 Age Age Patient Age Numerical [0,
100]
8 Gend Gender Patient Gender Categorical 2
9 Acat Activity Activity Category Categorical 4
10 Asub Activity Subcategory Categorical 19
11 Adet Activity Detail Categorical 21
12 ECca Error
Cause
Error Cause Category Categorical 3
13 ECsu Error Cause Subcategory Categorical 12
14 ECde1 Error Cause Detail1 Categorical 15
15 ECde2 Error Cause Detail2 Categorical 20
16 FOca Focus Focus Category Categorical 6
17 FOsu Focus Subcategory Categorical 12
18 FOde Focus Detail Categorical 23
from frequency analysis and other descriptive statistical analyses may provide biased
results.
The second step in this research is to develop a methodology to evaluate near-miss
reports and extract groups of such reports that may present hidden relations. In this pro-
cess, there is not a predetermined classiﬁcation of causes. The objective in this step is
to provide the risk analyst with groups of reports characterized by speciﬁc combinations
of attribute values that should be analyzed together to discover common causes. We use
clustering for this purpose.
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3.4.2 Clustering Categorical and Mixed Data
Selecting the most appropriate clustering algorithm depends on the speciﬁc character-
istics of the data and the objective of the analysis. Our work focuses on clustering near-
miss reports, which consist of both qualitative and quantitative attributes. However, there
is no universally valid pre-determined taxonomy of sources of risk to classify reports.
Therefore, data must be clustered without information about which categories are avail-
able to assign them to; thus unsupervised clustering will be used. Unsupervised clustering
consists of ﬁnding natural clusters in the dataset without a pre-determined number of
clusters or speciﬁc cluster-deﬁning characteristics. In unsupervised learning, the validity
of models and conclusions drawn from the analysis are subjective, since there are no
expectations or reference for results [154]. Additionally, the meaning of each cluster
should be guided by the data and validated by further subject matter expert analysis.
In this application, each near-miss report is a data point or observation. There are a
total of N observations in the database. Each observation, xi, i = 1, ...,N is characterized
by a pattern of m different attributes. Each attribute can be categorical or numerical de-
pending on its domain, Aj, j = 1, ...,m. Then, each observation xi is formed by the array
(xa1,xa2, ...,xam). Categorical attributes are nominal, i.e., the order of the coding does not
have an informative meaning. For example, the “factor” of the near-miss is arbitrarily
coded as: 1: human, 2: technical or 3: organizational.
The mixed nature of the near-miss data set allows for the use of methodologies to
cluster both categorical and mixed data. If a categorical-only data-clustering algorithm
is chosen, one can “discretize” numerical attributes into categorical by creating mean-
ingful categories within the numerical values that the attribute can take. In this paper, we
propose to use the K-prototypes algorithm, presented by Huang [155], because it does
not require transforming numerical attributes into categorical; it is designed for datasets
with mixed attributes. The k-prototypes algorithm seeks to minimize the cost of a cluster,
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which is the sum of distances of each element of the cluster to its corresponding proto-
type. The distance between elements is a combination of “mismatching” and Euclidean
distance for categorical and numerical attributes respectively. Mismatching determines the
number of attributes in which two categorical observations differ.
Any unsupervised clustering algorithm applicable to the data deﬁned by the preferred
taxonomy is applicable to the proposed methodology.
3.4.3 Methodology to Cluster Near-Misses
A near-miss cluster is deﬁned as a group of the near- miss reports with more than
1 element (it can be generalized to more than n0 elements). Near-miss clusters should
also have an item-set with a support higher than a speciﬁed threshold. The item-set will
represent the risk-source related to the cluster. The objective is to ﬁnd at least one low-
cost cluster that has item-sets with maximum support. The steps of the methodology are
outlined below:
1. Deﬁne parameters:
T : Threshold for item-sets. The threshold is deﬁned as the minimum support that
an item-set should have to be considered signiﬁcant.
ε: Positive number that represents insigniﬁcant change in the cost of the cluster
ensemble.
2. Evaluate the whole data set as a cluster using cluster indicators from table 3.2.
3. Cluster the dataset. See the proposed Unsupervised Bisecting K-Prototypes algo-
rithm presented later in this section.
4. For each resulting cluster, label it and record its elements and cluster indicators
table 3.2.
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5. Characterize the resulting clusters using item-sets.
6. Rank all resulting clusters (including the cluster formed by the whole dataset) ac-
cording to the preferred indicators.
It is assumed that cluster priority is based on identifying risk source characteristics
related to:
• Unknown or unexplored events, i.e., events with a lot of uncertainty associated
because there is not a clear idea of their probability or impact.
• Low probability, but high impact (severity) events.
• High probability, low impact events, i.e., events that occur frequently.
Indicators are deﬁned to represent each one of these characteristics. Table 3.2 presents
each indicator and how to obtain it. We propose to use these indicators to prioritize cluster
analysis. The arrangement shown in table 3.3 (in section 3.5) illustrates clusters ranked by
cost-density criteria.
In what follows, we deﬁne speciﬁc concepts related to the proposed methodology
to cluster near-misses to be used in step III of the methodology, illustrate the clustering
algorithm used and illustrate the outcomes of the methodology.
Let S be the data-set formed by N near-miss reports. Each report is characterized by
m attributes, out of which, mn are numerical and mc are categorical. Each categorical
attribute, j = 1, ...,mc, has a set of possible values Aj that come from the taxonomy.
Numerical attributes, j = mc+1, ...,m should be standardized to a number between 0 and
1. We will refer to the similarity of observations as d. Similarity between observations is
deﬁned in this paper as in [155].
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Table 3.2: Cluster indicators to be used in ranking of near-miss groups
Cluster Indicator Description
Cost, E(k) Clustering indicator that measures the quality of
the cluster in terms of its scatter. It is an output
of the clustering algorithm. See section 4.3.2.
% Novel reports Number of near-miss reports in the cluster whose
code does not have severity indicators assigned
yet.
Most likely
severity
Severity score that repeats the most within the
cluster. It is initially calculated automatically
from information in the risk database related
to the codes of the near-misses included in the
cluster.
Worst case scenario Worst severity found among the corresponding
codes of near-miss reports. Corresponds to
the minimum value in our scoring system.
It is initially calculated automatically from
information in the risk database.
Density Number of near-miss reports in the cluster.
Cost/Density Cluster cost as determined by clustering
methodology over number of near-misses in the
cluster.
Item-sets (support) Joint values of different attributes that occur
more frequently than the speciﬁed support. Item-
sets are found using the Apriori algorithm.
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3.4.4 Data Setup
1. Rearrange the columns of the dataset so categorical attributes are together, prefer-
ably, but not necessarily, at the beginning.
2. Standardize numerical attributes to a [0,1] scale where min(Aj) = 0 and
max(Aj) = 1, j = mc+1, ...,m
3. Set K = 1, i.e. the current number of clusters equal to 1. Assign the whole data set
to this cluster.
4. Set t = 0 (iteration t = 0).
5. Let the current cluster of interest k∗ = 1 and evaluate the maximum similarity
between elements within the cluster, dmax(1).
3.4.5 Iteration t
1. Step 1. Record the furthest elements of cluster k∗, f ∗1 and f
∗
2 . Assign these elements
to the set of initial prototypes, P0 so that: P10 = f
∗
1 and P
2
0 = f
∗
1 .
2. Step 2. Partition cluster k∗ into two sub-clusters by following the k-prototypes al-
gorithm described in Huang [155]. The output of this step consists of: the new sub-
clusters k∗1 and k
∗
2, the set of updated prototypes Pf , the maximum similarity within
each sub-cluster, dmax(k∗1) and dmax(k
∗
2), the cost of each cluster, Ek∗1 and Ek∗2 and
the total cost of the clustering scheme of iteration t, E(t) as deﬁned in [155].
3. Step 3. Update the current clustering ensemble for the iteration:
If 2 sub-clusters were produced (this can be observed by checking that the set of
updated prototypes has two elements) then:
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(a) Increase the number of clusters of the iteration:
K ← K+1
(b) Replace the cluster of interest with the ﬁrst sub-cluster:
k∗ ← k∗1
(c) Put the second sub-cluster in the last position of the list of clusters:
k ← K, and k ← k∗2
(d) Record the number of clusters of the current iteration.
nc(t)← K
Otherwise, leave the cluster ensemble as it currently is and set nc(t) = K.
4. Step 4. Verify stopping conditions:
If the total cost E(t) does not change signiﬁcantly, i.e. |E(t)−E(t − 1)| < ε , then
go to Step 6.
Otherwise, let t ← t+1.
5. Step 5. Choose the cluster with the highest dmax as the current cluster of interest,
k∗:
k∗ = argmaxk=1,...,K{dmax(k)}
Go to Step 1.
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6. Step 6. Verify that all prototypes are different, and run a ﬁnal iteration with the
ﬁnal distinct prototypes.
7. Step 7. For each cluster, calculate its density, nk, cost, E(k), and the ratio,
Ek
nk
.
The output of the algorithm is a table with the information obtained in Step 7. Further
analysis allows ranking of clusters by the indicators from table 3.2, to obtain a summary
similar to the one illustrated in table 3.3.
The unsupervised version of the k-prototypes algorithm is applicable to other al-
gorithms that use a spatial reference to deﬁne cluster centers such as k-means and k-
medoids, when there is no prior information that should help determine the initial centers.
The speed of the methodology depends on the speed of the clustering algorithm used;
therefore, simpler clustering algorithms are preferred. The convergence of the algorithm
is guaranteed if additional stopping conditions are considered (for example, maximum
number of clusters allowed, minimum number of elements in each cluster, desired cluster
ensemble cost reduction).
As mentioned in section 3.4.2, the validity of clusters from unsupervised learning will
depend on the analysis of clusters by experts, since there are no expectations or reference
for the corresponding results [154]. Since structured near-miss reports reﬂect the per-
ceptions of reporters, the resulting clusters are expected to reﬂect areas that healthcare
workers consistently relate to near-miss events experienced by them. We use clustering
to organize these data and help analysts in further investigation efforts. The proposed
clustering methodology ensures that obviously similar reports are grouped together, while
allowing for groups of “non-obviously” similar reports to be formed as well. The next
step in the proposed methodology is to characterize each cluster in terms of its compo-
nents.
The proposed clustering algorithm can be replaced within the overall methodology,
described in section 3.4.3, by other clustering techniques deemed applicable to the dataset
of interest.
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3.4.6 Cluster Characterization
Each cluster will be characterized by the signiﬁcant attribute values in their elements,
which are found in the corresponding item-sets. For categorical attributes, attribute values
present in the cluster in a proportion higher than a speciﬁed threshold (support) will be
used to characterize the cluster as the corresponding source of risk. The Apriori algorithm
[154] is proposed to ﬁnd item-sets for categorical attributes. Additionally, we propose
that signiﬁcant numerical attributes be determined by their coefﬁcient of variation, so
numerical values with small coefﬁcient of variation are included in the item-set.
3.5 Analysis of Near-Miss Clusters
While the taxonomy for near-misses is intended to characterize events (or potential
events), the distinct combinations of attribute values of coded reports is intended to guide
the identiﬁcation of sources of risk. Clustering coded near-misses provides the means
to ﬁnd subsets of near-misses likely to identify potential risk areas in the system, when
analyzed together.
The near-miss reporting and analysis system is being implemented at the University of
South Florida (USF) Health Clinics. Table 3.3 shows the output of our clustering method-
ology to a sample of 33 near-misses reported by USF personnel.
The table shows a list clusters ranked by values for cost-density ratio. Columns 5 to
15 show the corresponding attribute values of the cluster item-set. We omitted all the
date ﬁelds in this table. Column 4 (Support) shows the "support" of the item-set, which
can be interpreted as the proportion of reports within the cluster that have that particular
combination of attribute values in their individual code.
For example, the ﬁrst cluster in the rank, cluster No 3, has the majority of reports
(n = 21). This cluster is characterized 100% (Support = 1) by having taken place on
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Table 3.3: Summary of near-miss clusters
Item-set
Activity Error Cause Focus
No n Cost/n Support Site Category Category Sub-
category
Detail Detail Category Sub-
category
Gender Race Age
3 21 25.24 1 1 Human
Fac-
tors
Staff Prof-
essional
Staff
Physician Patient
Spe-
ciﬁc
Medical
Record
Prob-
lem
1 7 34.53 1 1 Human
Fac-
tors
4 3 38.26 1 WHT
2 1 67.42 1 Medical
Test/
Pro-
ce-
dure
Test /
Pro-
ce-
dure
Re-
lated
Results
Han-
dling
F 49.5
site 1, being related to patient-speciﬁc issues within the medical records, and being at-
tributed to physicians’ human factors. Events within this cluster can be further studied to
ﬁnd related potential sources of risk. In particular, when reviewing the comments of the
reports within the cluster, we found a consistent situation where critical documentation
for surgical procedures, such as orders and consent, is missing from the medical record.
Similar documentation problems were identiﬁed during the taxonomy brainstorming
sessions as a common threat to patient safety in the outpatient environment. Analysis by
the corresponding risk manager (or quality manager) should be done to identify actual
risks related to the documentation procedures and develop solutions to prevent potential
adverse events.
The second cluster in the rank, cluster number 1, is formed by reports that seem dif-
ferent. Moreover, this cluster has only one attribute in its item-set, which means that
the only common characteristic of these reports is that they are due to human factors.
This information may be insufﬁcient for further analysis of this particular cluster as an
indicator of a potential source of risk, and may be dismissed as a valid cluster.
Using this cluster structure in conjunction with a formal risk analysis technique will
allow for the identiﬁcation and validation of risk sources related to each cluster. Table 3.4
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Table 3.4: Modiﬁed “Systems Hazards Analysis”
Modiﬁed System Hazards Analysis
Cluster No: Item-sets:
Valid cluster? Risk sources identiﬁed:
No Near-miss
code
Near-miss
descrip-
tion
Severity
(IMRI)
Hazards/risks? Recommended
Actions
RA Status
From
reporting
system.
Ordered
according
to Item-
sets
From
reporting
system
From risk
database:
expected
severity
of near
misses
with
similar
code.
Automatic/overwrite. Automatic/add. Automatic,
tied to
hazard
risks
illustrates a modiﬁed System Hazard Analysis (SHA) for near-misses in each cluster. The
structure of SHA facilitates the use of information technology to automatically allocate
previous information to newly reported near-misses.
We modiﬁed the original System Hazard Analysis found in [156] by adding a header
of cluster characteristics, so that it can be used as a form to input risk analysis data in the
risk database. The header includes the cluster identiﬁer, item-set, check-box to validate
(or reject) the cluster after risk analysis and a ﬁeld to register actual system risks (hazards)
identiﬁed. Fields were added to characterize each near-miss within the cluster. A column
for near-miss code was included. We suggest automating an initial assignment of severity
score, hazards/risks and recommended actions from the database. The analyst will con-
ﬁrm or overwrite such assignments as a result of his/her analysis. For more information
about risk identiﬁcation and assessment techniques, refer to [156].
3.6 Validity
The main goal of our methodology is to ﬁnd clusters of near-misses that inform for-
mal risk analysis. Accordingly, the taxonomy was designed to be mutually exclusive and
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exhaustive. Therefore, the main attributes of a near-miss should be identiﬁed to make the
corresponding report using this taxonomy. We used brainstorming to identify as many of
the potential near-misses proper of outpatient settings as possible.
To ensure face validity, the taxonomy was mostly derived from the JC patient safety
event taxonomy, which is endorsed by the National Quality Forum [81]. Categories within
the “Activity” dimension in our taxonomy were obtained from some of the categories of
the “Type” dimension of the JC’s taxonomy. Similarly, the main categories in our “Error
Cause” dimension were derived from categories found in the JC’s “Cause” dimension.
Both of these were expanded to cover more explicitly the situations that may arise in the
USF outpatient clinic. Finally, our “Focus” dimension is a logical extension of informa-
tion required to characterize near-misses.
Additionally, the application of our methodology to the preliminary set of near-misses
resulted in tight clusters of obviously related reports (construct validity), as well as not-
so-obvious groups of events that share some characteristics, but that would probably have
been missed by individual analysis (concept validity). In our preliminary results, the most
consistent risk was related to documentation in the medical record, which also came up
during our brainstorming sessions as a common threat to patient safety. Refer to section
3.4.6 for details of the preliminary characterization and analysis of clusters.
3.7 Conclusions and Future Work
Near-miss reports, and the knowledge derived from their analysis, can be accumulated
over time to enhance the analysis and interpretation of reports. Availability of current
risk-information will strengthen risk identiﬁcation and effectively guide risk management
efforts. This article presented a methodology to systematically handle near-miss reports
and support their analysis.
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We described the main components of the methodology, beginning with a suggested
taxonomy structure to report near-misses and facilitate their processing. The taxonomy
is based on the JC patient safety event taxonomy, but less complex because it focuses on
the system where it will be used. Then, we used an unsupervised bisecting k-prototypes
algorithm to cluster near-misses. Unsupervised clustering yields groups of near-misses
that should be analyzed together for risk identiﬁcation. Finally, we suggest a modiﬁed
system hazard analysis, supported by a risk database, to aid analysts in the identiﬁcation
of system risks.
The overall methodology can be applied to all types of incidents and is not restricted
to near-misses. A different taxonomy for near-misses or incidents can be used if pre-
ferred. Additionally, a different clustering methodology can be used for clustering near-
miss reports. Finally, a preferred risk analysis methodology such as FMEA, or other, can
be implemented.
As mentioned in section 3.5, the near-miss reporting system has been partially im-
plemented at the University of South Florida Clinics. So far, the taxonomy has been de-
veloped (see section 3.2.2) and staff has been trained in its use. The reporting system is
available in all the computers within the facilities. The clustering methodology has been
manually applied to the reports available. Clusters have been prioritized using the cost-
density criteria, and risks related to documentation protocols have identiﬁed.
The next stages of development and implementation include automation, evaluation
and enhancement. The methodology will be automated into a risk database to accumulate
information about risk over time, and severity and novelty criteria will be included. The
overall methodology will be revisited to address speciﬁc situations that arise from day-to-
day use. Speciﬁcally, the cluster (risk) validation and learning portion of the methodology
will be evaluated and enhanced to appropriately manage information about invalid and
valid clusters, and the corresponding sources of risk that are identiﬁed over time.
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Chapter 4: Using Patient Safety Interventions to Monitor Risk in Healthcare
Delivery Systems
4.1 Introduction
In healthcare processes, failure is not always evident because it does not necessarily
result in adverse events. Therefore, one of the objectives of healthcare risk management
is to gather and analyze patient safety data to proactively identify potential failures that
may contribute to future adverse events. Common forms of patient safety data include
voluntary incident reports, patient complaints, and malpractice claims, among others.
The sources of occurrence of these outcomes are often indentiﬁed through qualitative
approaches that tend to be time consuming, and therefore infrequent.
This chapter focuses on developing a framework for risk analysis in healthcare deliv-
ery systems that includes a formal characterization of potential risk sources. The aim is
that such sources can be analyzed in terms of observable data, so that their performance
can be monitored on a more frequent basis. This framework is intended to become the
foundation for the design of an information and decision support system that stores and
processes both, patient safety data and the results of risk analysis, to provide healthcare
risk managers, and other stakeholders, with the appropriate, relevant, information at the
right time, to ensure safe care.
Ideally, patient safety data should be used to assess the likelihood of potential adverse
events and associated impact (or costs), and allocate preventive or corrective efforts (ﬁg-
ure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Traditional risk analysis model
In healthcare, a popular source of data about potential adverse events, is incident
reporting. Traditionally, reports of adverse events are analyzed to understand their causes,
assess their likelihood and prevent their recurrence. However, incident reporting sys-
tems are believed to capture only a small and biased portion of actual incidents that take
place in the system and therefore, it is not recommended that their rates of occurrences be
solely used to assess risk [87].
Other forms of patient safety data can provide with relevant information to create
a better picture about risk. Each form has its strengths and weaknesses. For example,
compared to other sources, chart review identiﬁes a larger number of failures [87], while
direct observation helps identify errors (commission/omission), or failures directly re-
lated to human performance [88]. These methodologies are costly and time consuming.
For this reason, chart review and direct observation are mostly used in time-limited or
problem-speciﬁc studies [89]. It has been argued that different approaches lead to the
identiﬁcation of different types of failure. Thus, it is recommended that several sources
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of safety data are concurrently used to create risk analysis models that support decisions
to enhance patient safety.
The use of disparate, perhaps incommesurable, sources of data to identify potential
sources of risk presents a challenge to healthcare risk managers. Even though several
information systems exist that process and present this data in a more understandable
fashion (histograms, runs charts), it is up to the analyst to discover connections and to
identify causes or sources. The causes of events of interest are mainly identiﬁed through
investigative and qualitative methods, and therefore conclusions are subject to circumstan-
cial, hindsight and background bias, which limits the consistency of results and efﬁciency
of derived solutions [7]. Frequently, these investigations tend to focus on human factors as
the cause [8].
The IOM patient safety research agenda emphasizes the importance of the develop-
ment of healthcare risk models, and the integration of retrospective and prospective risk
analysis techniques [26]. Risk modeling is useful to understand the mechanics of risk in
the system, unify knowledge, and explore and evaluate risk management options [157].
Such models should allow for the use of available data to assess risk and provide the
necessary information to help providers deliver appropriate and safe services [105].
The next section brieﬂy describes commonly used techniques for risk analysis in
healthcare. In addition, it introduces relevant concepts from general safety theories that
will be used to propose an explicit characterization of risk sources. This characterization
will become the foundation of our proposed modeling framework for risk in healthcare
systems.
4.2 Risk Identiﬁcation and Analysis
Traditionally, risk and safety have been concerned with identifying root causes of
observed adverse events and preventing their re-occurrence. The most commonly used
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tool for this purpose is RCA, which is used to investigate accident causes and determine
the necessary corrective actions [46]. However, RCA has disadvantages due to its qual-
itative and retrospective nature; it is time consuming, results are strongly inﬂuenced by
the background of the investigators, and it takes place when something has happened
and most likely somebody has been harmed. In addition, some suggest that RCA may be
biased toward the identiﬁcation of superﬁcial causes, since system causes are often related
to organizational issues that are easier to identify than to solve, such as inadequate stafﬁng
ratios or poor IT infrastructure [126].
There are several other techniques intended to analyze speciﬁc hazards or risks, de-
termine their causes, and deﬁne and manage the corresponding recommended actions
[156]. Safety researchers have been active in adapting existing methods, or proposing new
methodologies and models to analyze and understand the risk of adverse events and their
causes.
Basic theorists of safety and accident causation seem to agree that the the path to
adverse events is associated to the performance of safety constraints. Safety constraints
are functions, devices or procedures intended to prevent speciﬁc events. According to
Reason, adverse events are the product of safety constraints aligning their weaknesses to
allow for the occurrence of undesired events and their consequences [33]. This follows
Rasmussen’s thinking that the performance of systems should be analyzed “in terms of
system constraints, acceptable performance, and adaptation to change” [17].
Along these lines, several researchers have proposed risk models based on the analysis
of the performance of safety constraints. Leveson proposed to view adverse events as the
result of inefﬁcient controls on the interactions of system components. Their method-
ology STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) provides the means
to investigate and analyze adverse events in terms of ineffective system controls as risk
sources [14]. However, this is mainly a static, retrospective, qualitative methodology.
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Similarly, Aven et al. proposed a method to estimate risk of hydrocarbon release in
offshore platforms in terms of safety constraints. Their methodology combines traditional
risk analysis techniques, available industry data on probability and frequency of adverse
events, and assessment of risk inﬂuencing factors within the particular organization. The
outcomes of the methodology are a measure of risk and an analysis of the performance
of safety barriers that facilitates decision making to enhance system safety [15]. This
method also uses the concept of constraints to analyze risk and identify its sources. It is
prospective (rather than retrospective) since it uses event trees and fault trees to analyze
potential adverse events before they take place. It can be applied to different types of
adverse events. Nevertheless, it is a static analysis methodology that has to be carried out
every time the analysis is needed, since some input data and parameters may change.
Rognin et al. [158] suggest that global reliability of socio-technical systems relies on
regulation. Regulation is a systematic behavior in one part of the system that constraints
some behavior in other part of the system. The authors develop a model of information
cooperation and regulation to analyze its impact in system reliability.
Chuang [16] proposed a retrospective methodology to analyze patient safety events
as part of a control problem. The methodology is called SOEA (system oriented event
analysis). The authors use patient safety and quality indicators to determine which patient
safety events and related system components will be analyzed. Selected system compo-
nents related to the events are classiﬁed according to their attributes (ﬂow components,
structural components, and operating components) and hazard evaluation is performed
to discover other system components that affect performance. Then, new controls are
imposed to the system to enhance its performance. The advantage of this methodology
is that it provides a framework to deﬁne the system to be analyzed, including interactions
with other systems, so that risk analysis identiﬁes sources that are not necessarily con-
tained in the system of interest.
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This research proposes to use the concept of safety constraints for prospective risk
identiﬁcation and analysis in healthcare delivery systems. Sources of risk are character-
ized with the safety constraints available in the system, so that risk analysis focuses on
ﬁnding relations between these sources and potential adverse events through observable
data. In the context of healthcare, patient safety interventions can be regarded as safety
constraints.
4.3 Patient Safety Interventions
When risks are identiﬁed, then they should be controlled by means of the appropriate
treatment [159]. In healthcare, risk control is generally achieved through the implementa-
tion of patient safety interventions (PSIs), e.g. technology, improved procedures, or new
policies intended to improve care by minimizing harm to patients, and thus risk [160].
PSIs are analogous to safety constraints in other industries. A PSI becomes a “safety
constraint” once it is implemented. We will use the word “intervention” to refer to both,
interventions and constraints.
The main objective of PSIs is to guide processes along a safe path, to reduce incidents
and adverse events [126]. Nevertheless, because of the socio-technical nature of health-
care delivery systems, some interventions may not always perform as intended. Once
implemented, different factors may affect their functioning. For example, in a bar-code
medication administration system, technical factors, such as damaged bar codes [161],
will counteract the initial purpose of ensuring the administration of the right medica-
tion to patients. Also, human factors, such as human errors, will prevent staff from cor-
rectly using the bar code reader. Additionally, organizational factors, such as insufﬁcient
training, will have a similar effect on the process. Therefore, and following the general
safety literature trend (previous section), we propose to use patient safety interventions to
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characterize potential risk sources, whose performance should be monitored over time to
detect potentially dangerous deviations that may result in adverse events.
This research proposes to use patient safety interventions to characterize sources of
risk, and to assess the likelihood of adverse events (PAEs), as shown in ﬁgure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Risk analysis model using patient safety interventions
However, the performance of patient safety interventions is not a readily observable
quantity and it should be deﬁned and measured, or assessed. Since patient safety data
provides insight into risks, then available patient safety data should be used to assess the
performance of patient safety interventions, so that risks can be assessed, while poten-
tially relevant risk-sources are identiﬁed (see ﬁgure 4.3).
The implications of using patient safety data to assess the performance of interven-
tions rather than to directly identify errors, or assess the likelihood of potential adverse
events, include:
• The explicit deﬁnition of risk sources to guide analysis (such as RCA) and focus on
practical problems and realistic solutions.
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Figure 4.3: Proposed risk analysis model
• The opportunity to redeﬁne the “risk domain” of an organization to include PSIs as
potential “areas” or points of interest.
• The increased motivation to understand the performance of patient safety interven-
tions and their relation to different sources of patient safety data, which can be used
to develop decision support models.
• The ability to justify the gathering of additional types of data, such as chart reviews,
when there is suspicion about the latency of speciﬁc risk sources.
• The need for information systems to manage patient safety data by assigning oc-
currences to the corresponding interventions, so that analysis can be automated and
feedback expedited.
• The reduction in time required to analyze patient safety data and identify sources of
risk.
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• The expected improvement in the reliability of some patient safety data sources,
such as incident reporting, since people would report to point the substandard per-
formance of a system component, the PSI, rather than to expose an error or admit
blame.
However, the format and nature of patient safety data hinders the use of traditional
(statistical) modeling tools to assess the performance of patient safety interventions. Pa-
tient safety data, such as incident reports and patient complaints, are often incomplete.
In addition, these data do not constitute a random sample of the incidents that take place
in the system. Furthermore, most patient safety interventions consist of procedures (such
as handwashing, or barrier precautions) for which a frequency of use cannot be easily
assessed to determine outcome rates. Therefore, there is the need to develop an under-
standing of the actual relation between observable patient safety data and the performance
of patient safety interventions. Even the ability to link observable outcomes to the per-
formance of speciﬁc PSIs provides relevant information about risk in the system to guide
further investigation or risk analysis efforts.
In the remainder of this chapter we present suggestions for developing a formal char-
acterization of healthcare delivery systems that includes risk, and facilitates risk analysis
using traditional methods and information technology. Such characterization will be used
in the next chapter in an analytical model that uses available data to model the perfor-
mance of patient safety interventions.
4.4 Developing a Healthcare Risk Model
According to Kessels-Habraken et al., incident reporting and analysis is strengthened
by (a prior) prospective risk analysis of the system [162]. In agreement with this result,
we propose to use prospective risk analysis to identify potential adverse events and then
merge this knowledge with forthcoming patient safety data, for example incident reports,
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to monitor risk. Most of the existing (traditional and novel) risk analysis methodologies
are mostly qualitative and static. Thus, the analysis depends greatly on the background
and experience of the investigator [8], feedback takes long periods of time, and conclu-
sions may become obsolete as the system changes. Our proposed framework addresses
these gaps by providing for a platform to centralize knowledge in an modeling framework
that accommodates the outputs of traditional risk analysis and available patient safety
data.
4.4.1 Modeling Approach
Table 4.1: Modeling assumptions
Assumptions
• The healthcare delivery system is formed by 2 parallel subsystems,
i.e., the service and risk systems, as proposed by [32].
• The service system is formed by resources, activities and services
provided within the system.
• The risk system is formed by patient safety interventions in the
system.
• Risks will be mapped to the performance of patient safety interven-
tions.
We propose to view the healthcare system as two parallel subsystems, namely the
service system and the risk system, as suggested by Cooke [32].
The service system is formed by the resources available within the delivery system.
These resources can be divided into classes or types, for example: medical providers, sup-
porting staff, patient information system, equipment, facilities, supplies, and procedures
[71]. The performance of the risk system is evaluated through quality and cost indicators.
The risk system is characterized by the set of PSIs. PSIs are safety constraints de-
signed and put in place to prevent (speciﬁc) potential adverse events (PAEs). Although
some PSIs may come from outside the system (e.g. government regulation) [17], focus
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may be initially placed on those that are under the control of the system. Interventions
originally designed and implemented to control patient safety outcomes, and subsequently
improve quality outcomes, should be considered as system constraints. A checklist before
surgery is an example of a PSI.
The performance of the risk system should be evaluated and monitored using patient
safety data. Examples of patient safety data are near-misses, mandatory and voluntary
incident reports, morbidity and mortality cases, malpractice claims, and triggers [34],
among others. Each type of patient safety data, as deﬁned by the organization’s risk do-
main or by a standard classiﬁcation system [80, 81, 151] constitutes an outcome; e.g., a
blood-product near-miss report following the AHRQ common formats event description.
Interactions among system components (resources and PSIs) will be determined by
the activities and services. Given the service and risk systems, there is a number of activ-
ities (or classes of tasks) that can be performed within the boundaries of the system e.g.
injecting a patient, rehabilitative therapy, and others. They are characterized by system
components that they require to be carried out, such as resources required for the activity,
level of participation of the patient (active, passive, not present), formal procedures, and
PSIs related.
Activities form sequences, or sets, that deﬁne services. Note that an activity could be
be carried out several times within a particular service.
Figure 4.4: The service and risk systems (from Cooke and Rohleder, 2006)
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Figure 4.5: An example of a service
Every service can be associated with particular patient safety outcomes, and potential
adverse event(s) (PAEs). PAEs are events of concern due to past experience within the
system or in other (similar) systems. PAEs are not frequently observed in normal opera-
tion, however their severity demands that controls are in place to avoid them. Some PAEs
can be identiﬁed through speciﬁc patient safety data sources, such as mandatory adverse
event reporting. PAEs should be carefully deﬁned since they pose the highest severity
among all possible patient safety outcomes, and should be avoided.
Other patient safety outcomes, such as near-misses, are more common in daily op-
erations and are believed to suggest the extent of the risk of PAEs [43]. Therefore, it is
strongly recommended that these outcomes are monitored and prospectively analyzed to
assess and prevent PAEs [26]. Different services may be related to one or more patient
safety outcomes and PAEs. Each PAE related to each service can be subsequently related
to speciﬁc activities, and thus to particular system components (resources and PSIs).
Systems analysis and prospective risk analysis methods can be used to characterize
the system for the ﬁrst time, and to update it when necessary. The proposed characteriza-
tion is intended to help organize current knowledge about the system and its (expected)
performance. Once the system is characterized by its resources, PSIs, data sources, ser-
vices, PAEs and patient safety outcomes, their relations can be established using tradi-
tional risk assessment methods, and be used to develop models that facilitate the anal-
ysis of upcoming patient safety data. The result of this stage can be incorporated into
a database that can be used in future risk analysis efforts. Such database would act as a
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central of risk-knowledge, where new relations are incorporated as they are discovered
and old relations may be removed as they are proved invalid.
4.4.2 Risk Analysis Database
Although gathering initial data for the model might seem time consuming, the pro-
cess is not signiﬁcantly different from risk analysis efforts common in most healthcare
settings. The proposed characterization allows for the use of database structures to track
events of interest, such as what PSIs and resources are related to observed outcomes or
PAEs (ﬁgure 4.6). Besides, it will be possible to update the database and interactions as
new components are added to the system, such as new interventions implemented. Results
of risk analysis, such as FMEA and RCA, can also be included in the database to relate
activities and interventions to patient safety outcomes and PAEs. Figure 4.9 illustrate an
example of the relations in a characterization-database.
Figure 4.6: Backtracking from observable data
From this characterization, risks related to a particular PAE can be analyzed in terms
of their associated services or activities. In addition, when particular outcomes are ob-
served, then priority can be given to study components and interactions shared by these
outcomes.
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4.4.3 System Visualization
So far we have deﬁned sets of components and their interactions. Visualizing the
model helps sharing it with other stakeholders and validating it. It also facilitates risk
analysis by showing relations that may otherwise be overlooked. A natural way to visu-
alize our system characterization is using graph models [163], since they allow for the
representation of relations between different types of entities, or system components.
Figure 4.7 shows a graph where nodes represent resources, PSIs, activities, services
and outcomes (we included patient safety outcomes, PAEs and quality outcomes). For
simplicity, we have clustered the nodes according to their type. We have added a node
named “patient” to denote the patient being present, or not, in an activity (whenever there
is an edge from the patient node to such activity). Nodes with the legend “qn” represent
quality data sources, which may be included in the system characterization if desired.
Whenever an outcome takes place, the related resources and interventions can be
identiﬁed, as shown in ﬁgure 4.8. PAEs related to the outcome, its resources or PSIs can
also be identiﬁed.
4.5 Risk Analysis
The proposed system representation facilitates the organization of data and infor-
mation about the system, allowing for risk analysis to be performed at each node. This
graph representation can be used to support probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) [28], in
which edges that connect outcomes to services, activities or any other entity can be given
a weight equal to the perceived likelihood of such entity causing the outcome. Similarly,
the severity can be allocated to each outcome node. If there is information about the ex-
pected frequency of services, then a likelihood of such outcomes could be estimated using
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Figure 4.7: Example of graph representation
PRA calculations and such nodes could then be ranked in terms of their corresponding
risk scores.
In what follows, we elaborate in the use of commonly known risk analysis techniques
using the proposed system characterization.
4.5.1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FMEA is a prospective risk analysis methodology that involves quantiﬁcation of be-
liefs related to risk and outcomes. We suggest the use of FMEA every time the system
changes or grows to reﬂect such changes in the model. In this section, we illustrate the
use of FMEA to build and update a model in terms of patient safety interventions and
available patient safety data. We propose to use the structure of a traditional FMEA [156,
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Figure 4.8: Tracking outcome 4 in the graph representation
164] to assess the possible states of PSIs, but incorporating information about observable
outcomes that are believed to be related to each intervention and corresponding failure
modes.
We propose to perform an expanded version of the Failure Modes and Effects Anal-
ysis (eFMEA). The objective of the eFMEA is to facilitate the organization of existing
knowledge about the risk system. The information obtained from the eFMEA can be
incorporated into the risk database to be consulted in future risk identiﬁcation efforts,
and updated as new patient safety interventions are added to the risk system or new links
between PSIs, potential adverse events, and observable data are identiﬁed (ﬁgure 4.9).
The goal of the eFMEA is to match services with patient safety interventions, PAEs and
outcomes. Therefore, the FMEA is setup following a list of services and PAE’s identiﬁed
previously. If new PAEs arise, they must be appended to the list and related to the cor-
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responding service. When PAE’s are related to speciﬁc services, they are automatically
linked to speciﬁc activities (and their activity sets), facilitating the identiﬁcation of risk in
interactions of speciﬁc system components (resources and constraints).
The expanded FMEA is illustrated in table 5.1.The logic of the table follows. After
selecting a service for analysis, the potential adverse events (PAEs) that can be related to
that service are listed (column 1). PAEs can be thought of as failure modes of the corre-
sponding service; each service can have more than one PAE assigned to them, and PAEs
can be assigned to more than one service. The potential undesirable effects of the PAE
are also recorded (column 2). Each adverse event is assigned scores for likelihood of
occurrence, likelihood of detection and severity, according to a traditional FMEA or some
agreed-upon scale (columns 3-5). Up to this point, the analysis is similar to a traditional
FMEA, and thus a risk priority number (RPN) can be calculated (column 6). In addi-
tion, participants are asked to identify the patient safety interventions (PSIs) (or lack of)
(column 7) that attempt to prevent the occurrence of the adverse event in question and
the possible states of the PSI that are expected to contribute mostly to the occurrence of
this PAE (analogous to failure modes of interventions) (column 8). Depending on the
latency of the PAE and the state of the intervention, different outcomes in patient safety
data sources might be observed (column 9). The likelihood of observing one of those
outcomes given the latency of the PAE in question and the state of the intervention is
recorded (column 10). Finally, participants are asked to assess what is the likelihood of
observing the corresponding PAE if the PSI is in the respective state (column 11).
The main difference from traditional versions of FMEA can be seen in the last ﬁve
columns of table 5.1. It consists of identifying and assessing the likelihood of possible
observable outcomes that depend on the state of patient safety interventions. This assess-
ments will allow to link observable outcomes to states of patient safety interventions and
potential adverse events to be used in models of risk. Likelihood and rate (or frequency)
estimates can be assessed according to a scale that is familiar to those performing the
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analysis. Units of reference may include percentage of patients experiencing such out-
comes in a speciﬁc period, total number of outcomes in a period, number of outcomes per
number of patient-bed days, outcomes per patient days at risk, and number of outcomes
per times the intervention was used in the period of interest. It is important that the period
of this frequency, or a denominator for a rate, can be assessed using the administrative
information system of the organization, so that these can be used in modeling efforts
using actual rates of observed data. The literature has some standard scores that may be
used for this purpose [156, 165].
Figure 4.9: Example of characterization database
4.5.2 Root Cause Analysis
Whenever an outcome of interest takes place, an RCA can be guided by inspection
of the graph representation of the system (section 4.4.3). When the system size does not
allow for visual inspection, a query in the risk database (section 4.4.2) will ease the pro-
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cess of linking outcomes to potential sources during the course of an RCA. Findings from
the RCA can be used to validate and update the risk model by adding or removing entities
and (or) interactions. In such a case, the poposed model serves as a central location for
knowledge obtained from data, and from risk analysis.
4.5.3 Risk Mapping
If the frequency of each service can be forecasted, then ﬁgure 4.8 can be used to guide
the assessment of the probability of adverse events. The assessment team can focus on
assessing the probability weights of the links between services, outcomes and adverse
events. The information from the eFMEA can be used to obtain this assessments. There-
fore, once information about risks are included in the risk database through an eFMEA,
then risk maps can be created by combining the relevant information, avoiding duplicate
assessments that may be inconsistent. Furthermore, analysis of the resulting risk map can
be used to conﬁrm or question the validity of the knowledge about risk that is currently
stored in the database.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter justiﬁed the use of patient safety interventions as sources of risk, as it
is supported by the general safety literature. In addition, it proposed a plan to gather,
organize and use data commonly available in healthcare. Furthermore, we illustrated how
this characterization can be used to facilitate risk analysis through traditional methods.
Structuring information about the system and available data in the proposed man-
ner, allows for the development of models of the performance of risk sources in terms
of observable outcomes, and potentially facilitates risk analysis, enhancing its beneﬁts.
Still, operational data in healthcare tends to be incomplete and biased. In addition, most
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information about risk comes from experts’ assessments and the analysis of faulty data.
Therefore, models that aim to address risk identiﬁcation and analysis should account for
these limitations in data and information.
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Chapter 5: Maximum-Entropy Based Model to Monitor Risk in Healthcare Delivery
Systems
5.1 Introduction
Some say that healthcare itself is one of the main causes of death in the world [162].
Healthcare delivery systems are human driven, and as such, care processes are subject
to variability and change over time. Variability in human behavior can not only bring
resilience to the system [57, 166], but can also lead to behaviors that cause unintended
outcomes, thus increasing the risk of harm to patients beyond acceptable thresholds [47].
In addition, the increased use of technology has introduced new risks related to the use
of medical devices and equipment. Risks related to substandard human-technology in-
teractions are difﬁcult to identify and assess due to their ubiquity and inconspicuousness.
In healthcare settings, risks are visible when it is too late, which means that somebody
has been harmed. Therefore, there is the need for the systematic identiﬁcation of risks in
order to prevent harm to patients.
Healthcare organizations usually identify risks using mostly qualitative risk analysis
methodologies, such as Root Cause Analysis (RCA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), and Risk Mapping. These tools focus mostly on determining scores for the
likelihood and severity of identiﬁed risks. Scores are generally obtained from experts’
assessments, ideally based on historical data about previously identiﬁed risks. These
analyses are designed so that they must be conducted each time that there is a concern
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regarding safety, and their outcomes are generally a set of failure modes or causes that
should be addressed to reduce the latency of the corresponding risk.
The main reason for the popularity of qualitative risk analysis methodologies lies on
the availability and shape of related data. A major concern for the Institute of Medicine
(IOM), and a challenge for risk managers, has been the lack and limitations of operational
data to allow for continuous analysis and monitoring using traditional or statistics-based
techniques. Patient safety data consist of facts, observations, and/or measurements that
lead to the identiﬁcation of failures that harmed (or could have harmed) patients. They
are often incomplete and subject to bias, since they are usually obtained from healthcare
workers in the form of free text or narrative [151], even though they may be classiﬁed
according to a taxonomy or event classiﬁcation for analysis [19, 80].
The need for the development of tools that systematically organize, process and ana-
lyze patient safety data is important to help healthcare risk managers overcome the limita-
tions of their human condition and enhance their efforts to make sense of risk in a consis-
tent manner. We formulated an analytical model that integrates experts’ risk assessments
(similar to those of an FMEA) and available patient safety data to identify potentially
relevant sources of risk. The proposed model is intended to support an automated risk
analysis engine for decision making in healthcare risk management. The underlying risk
model allows for the identiﬁcation of potential risk sources by ﬁnding connections among
outcomes and system components that the naked eye is likely to miss because they seem
irrelevant, or because the corresponding assessments may have been forgotten over time.
Risk managers could then focus on understanding the system, identifying sources of risk,
updating their assessments and the model, and developing strategies to prevent or solve
patient safety problems.
To build the desired risk analysis model, potential sources of risk were explicitly char-
acterized in terms of system components whose performance should be monitored over
time. Then, FMEA assessments were adapted to link commonly available and observable
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data to the performance of such risk-sources. The Principle of Maximum Entropy (Max-
ent) was used to assess probability-based scores for each risk-source, given the limitations
of available patient safety data. Using the output of the proposed Maxent formulation,
the risk analyst can use RCA to conﬁrm the validity of risk ﬂags and determine the need
for intervention. Our proposed model is based on FMEA and RCA because these are the
most common risk analysis techniques in healthcare, and their use will facilitate under-
standing and implementation.
This research has several contributions. (i) It provides new insights on the analysis
of risks by revisiting the focus of risk assessment efforts and introducing a well deﬁned
set of risk sources that should be monitored to guide analysis and support decision mak-
ing. (ii) It introduces the states of these risk sources as an intermediate measure of risk
that can be used for the assessment of the likelihood of adverse events, while providing
for explicit criteria to identify potentially relevant sources. (iii) It contributes to the risk
analysis literature by formulating a model that is built using information and methods that
are commonly available in healthcare systems (e.g. FMEA), and available patient safety
data (e.g. incident reports). In general, the proposed approach advances healthcare risk
analysis by providing a structure for the many available sources of information about risk,
and combining them in a model. This approach will facilitate and expedite risk analysis
by directly pinpointing potentially relevant risk sources, and will help diagnose the need
for new or updated assessments given observed data.
The next section provides some detail on healthcare risk identiﬁcation and analysis,
introduces the concept of patient safety interventions as risk sources, illustrates the use of
an expanded version of an FMEA that incorporates observable data, and formulates the
underlying risk model. Section 5.3 presents the Maxent formulation to assess probability-
based scores, while section 5.4 illustrates how identiﬁcation and monitoring of risks is
facilitated using the proposed formulation. Section 5.5 contains remarks and comments
about future research directions.
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5.2 Modeling Risk in Healthcare Delivery Systems
In healthcare, as in other sectors, risk management aims to systematically identify all
risks within the organization. These include risks that compromise patient safety which
are the focus of this paper. Risks in healthcare are understood and characterized in many
ways, even within a single institution; and are generally perceived as the exposure to
circumstances that may lead to adverse (undesirable, preventable) events. Examples of
risks could be: the potential for a patient fall, the potential for acquiring an infection
during a hospital stay, or the potential of an employee getting a needlestick injury.
According to Rasmussen [17], socio-technical systems such as healthcare delivery
systems lack some structure that would allow them to use traditional predictive risk anal-
ysis tools. For example, organizations such as power plants have technology that allows
them to track system performance and determine potentially dangerous trends. However,
healthcare services are human driven and many healthcare processes cannot be automated
for data collection. Therefore, patient safety data tends to be incomplete and biased.
Healthcare organizations collect a wide range of data that are utilized for risk identi-
ﬁcation and analysis, including: mandatory and voluntary incident reports, malpractice
claims information, patient complaints, quality indicators, rounds, chart reviews (i.e.
occurrence screening) and administrative information, among others. There is no formal
mechanism to use these data in the identiﬁcation of risks. These data are generally clas-
siﬁed into the organization’s risk domain or classiﬁcation system and analyzed by areas
of interest. Tools recommended for the analysis of such data include run charts, Pareto
charts and histograms [4].
After risks are identiﬁed, they should be analyzed to assess the likelihood of related
adverse events and their severity or potential for loss. Risk analysis looks deeper into the
data to identify underlying system issues that contribute to adverse events, to prioritize
and plan for resources, and to deﬁne appropriate treatments or solutions. Formal risk
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analysis is also triggered by the occurrence of an unexpected adverse event (e.g. a patient
fall)[167], or by the implementation of a new or changed process (e.g design of a new
operating room). Likelihood and severity are generally assigned in the form of scores that
are obtained from the assessments of experts who are familiar with the process.
The most common methods for risk analysis are FMEA and RCA. FMEA is a struc-
tured proactive method to identify the ways in which a process may fail —failure modes—
in order to assess their likelihood of occurrence, likelihood of detection, and potential for
harm [164]. Assessments are given in the form of standard scales or rates that make sense
to the analysts. There are standard ﬁelds in an FMEA, but some variations are found in
the literature [156, 164, 165, 168]. RCA is a method to identify causes of events such
as near-misses, adverse events and other important events. When conducted on adverse
events, it is a mainly retrospective methodology that addresses the root causes of observed
incidents by asking questions about the incident, its consequences and potential sources
[60].
Although some methods have been proposed to utilize the results of these types of risk
analysis over time [169], it is common that assessments are used for a one-time decision
making. New assessments are obtained by conducting a new analysis when deemed nec-
essary [164]. We propose that the results of risk analysis be used over time to facilitate
risk monitoring and to detect changes in the performance of the system, reﬂecting the
need for new assessments.
We propose an explicit characterization of risk sources, so that risk analysis activities
and models focus on their performance and incorporate their effects on observable data.
We explored the broader safety literature to deﬁne this characterization in terms of system
components whose performance should be monitored over time. The next section presents
the concept of patient safety interventions and proposes their use as sources of risk.
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5.2.1 Sources of Risk: Patient Safety Interventions
Analysis of patient safety data should lead to the identiﬁcation of current risks, to
the foreseeing of possible critical adverse events, and ultimately, to the development of
strategies aimed at preventing or mitigating circumstances that challenge the safety of
patients [4]. These strategies generally consist of the selection and implementation of
patient safety interventions. These interventions can be technology, improved procedures,
or new policies to improve care processes. They are analogous to the concept of safety
constraint in other industries, and their main objective is to guide processes in order to
reduce patient safety incidents and adverse events [126].
According to the safety literature, safety constraints play an important role in the
occurrence of accidents [8, 17, 33]. Some authors have proposed models based on the per-
formance of safety constraints to identify and assess risk [14, 15]. However, these models
have similar disadvantages to RCA and FMEA, in that they are also mainly qualitative,
and thus time consuming. Generally, the results of theses analyses are static, which means
that they have to be conducted every time the analysis is needed.
In this work, we propose to use the concept of safety constraints in healthcare sys-
tems, i.e. patient safety interventions (PSIs), to characterize the set of potential sources
of risk. We use PSIs to facilitate the analysis of patient safety data. We refer to the set of
the sources of risk, or PSIs, as the risk system [32]. We deﬁne the state of the risk system
as a vector of the states of all PSIs. The goal is to determine the most likely state of the
risk system in the least biased manner, given the available data and the current knowl-
edge about risks. The state of each PSI is assumed to be binary, and deﬁned as normal
operation and failed state. These states correspond to the intervention, either working
as intended upon implementation, or not, respectively. In the next section we illustrate
an analysis similar to an FMEA but based on patient safety interventions and observable
outcomes, which can be used to build a model to monitor risk in healthcare systems.
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5.2.2 Using Failure Modes and Effects Analysis to Monitor Risk
To assess the possible states of PSIs, we propose an expanded FMEA (eFMEA) in-
corporating information about observable outcomes that are related to each interven-
tion and their corresponding states. Ideally, the eFMEA facilitates the organization of
knowledge about the risk system in order to model its performance using observable data.
The information obtained from the eFMEA exercise can be stored, updated, and utilized
subsequently in identifying risks.
As in the traditional FMEA, the analysis should be conducted by a team. The eFMEA
is set up following a list of services offered by the unit of analysis, e.g. clinic, department,
or other. We refer to this unit of analysis as the system. We interpret the different kinds of
potential adverse events (PAEs) as failure modes of the healthcare system. When PAEs
are identiﬁed for a particular service, and such a PAE has no related intervention in place,
then the traditional FMEA should follow. In this case, the corresponding corrective ac-
tion could be considered as a new intervention in the system. In addition, the eFMEA
encourages risk analysts to take a step further and to deﬁne what observable outcomes are
expected given an intervention state.
Table 5.1 shows an example of a form that can be used to conduct this expanded FMEA.
Table 5.1: Expanded FMEA form for a particular service
PAE PAE Occurrence Detection Severity RPN PSI PSI Outcome PSI-State Likelihood
(Failure Effects Likelihood Likelihood State (Observable) Outcome of PAE
Mode) Rate in PSI-state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
The logic of table 5.1 follows. After selecting a service for analysis, the PAEs that can
be related to that service are listed (column 1). PAEs can be thought of as failure modes
of the corresponding service; each service can have more than one PAE associated with
them, and PAEs can be assigned to more than one service. The potential undesirable
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effects of the PAE are also recorded (column 2). Each adverse event is assigned scores
for the likelihood of occurrence, the likelihood of detection, and the severity, according
to a traditional FMEA or some agreed-upon scale (columns 3-5). Up to this point, the
analysis is similar to a traditional FMEA, and thus a risk priority number (RPN) can be
calculated (column 6). In addition, participants are asked to identify the PSIs (or lack of)
(column 7) that attempt to prevent the occurrence of the adverse event in question and
the possible states of the PSI that are expected to contribute mostly to the occurrence of
this PAE (analogous to failure modes of interventions) (column 8). Depending on the
latency of the PAE and the state of the intervention, different outcomes in patient safety
data sources may be observed (column 9). The expected frequency of observing one of
those outcomes, given the latency of the PAE in question and the state of the intervention,
is recorded as the state dependent outcome frequency (column 10). Finally, participants
are asked to assess what is the likelihood of observing the corresponding PAE if the PSI is
in the respective state (column 11).
The main difference from traditional versions of the FMEA can be seen in the last ﬁve
columns of table 5.1. It consists of identifying and assessing the expected frequency, or
rate, of possible observable outcomes that depend on the state of PSIs. These assessments
allow to link observable outcomes to states of PSIs and PAEs to be used in models of risk.
The estimates of likelihood and frequency, or rate, can be assessed according to a scale
that is familiar to those performing the analysis. The corresponding units of reference
may include percentage of patients experiencing such outcomes in a speciﬁc period, total
number of outcomes in a period, number of outcomes per number of patient-bed days,
outcomes per patient days at risk, and number of outcomes per times the intervention
was used in the period of interest. It is important that the period of this frequency, or
a denominator for a rate, can be assessed using the administrative information system
of the organization. The literature has some standard scores that may be used for this
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purpose [156, 165]. Table 5.9 shows an example of a scale that may be used to obtain
these assessments.
The next section presents the formulation of the model built from the information
obtained from the eFMEA and explains the objectives of the corresponding analysis.
5.2.3 Problem Formulation
This research focuses on a healthcare delivery system. A system can be a single unit
or department of an organization, for example the emergency department at the local
hospital. The system has several resources that determine the activities or tasks that can
be performed. Among these resources, there is the set of potential risk sources, i.e. the
risk system, I . These risk-sources are related to both, the set of PAEs known to the sys-
tem, E , and the set of patient safety outcomes, O . The set of PAEs is formed by the ele-
ments in column 1 of the eFMEA, and the set of outcomes is deﬁned by the available pa-
tient safety data sources, such as particular types of incident reports, or categories of pa-
tient complaints, among others. We assume that patient safety outcomes are categorical-
nominal, and that they may be incomplete and biased.
For every period of interest (e.g. a shift or a week), the frequency or rate of the differ-
ent patient safety outcomes can be obtained. These outcomes include events that are less
severe than adverse events. For risk identiﬁcation, we assume that an assessment of the
probability of PAEs, P{e},e∈ E , is desired. We will use the information obtained from an
eFMEA to build a model that allows for the assessment of such a probability. However,
it is expected that the assessments obtained from an eFMEA are strongly biased by the
background of the experts involved. Therefore, these assessments, as well as the probabil-
ity scores obtained from our proposed formulation, are interpreted as the representation of
the existing knowledge about the risk system [133].
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To assess P{e}, we use the state of PSIs, yi ∈ Si, as an intermediate variable; there
are N interventions in the system. Si represents the set of possible states of intervention
i. This state represents the behavior of the particular patient safety intervention, compared
to what it was expected from it upon implementation. Using this intermediate quantity
has the advantage of obtaining a measure of the relevance of potential risk sources, allow-
ing for their prioritization in subsequent analysis and improvement efforts.
However, often the state of the risk system is not obvious. Determining the state of the
risk system requires an analysis that includes human, organizational and technical factors.
Since these types of analyses are costly and time consuming, their use in healthcare is
infrequent. Still, monitoring the behavior of the risk system should be done periodically
to account for adaptations and changes in the system (turnover, new laws, learning curves,
among others) [17].
Since PSIs are intended to prevent speciﬁc adverse events and patient safety outcomes
are forms of failure, which may reﬂect the latency of such adverse events, we propose to
use patient safety outcomes to assess the possible states of patient safety interventions.
We denote the observed frequency of outcome o j as f (o j).
If we let y = (y1,y2, ...,yN) be the state of the risk system (a vector of the states of
each intervention), S = (S1 ×S2 × ...×SN) be the set of size n = 2N that repre-
sents the cartesian product of the sets of state of all interventions in the system, and f =
( f (o1), f (o2), ..., f (oM)) be the actual frequency of occurrence of outcomes o1,o2, ...,oM
in a period, then the problem can be expressed as ﬁnding the value y that produced f in
the period of interest. For this purpose, we need g, so that:
g(y) = f (5.1)
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The function g is the risk model and it represents the existing knowledge about the
behavior of the risk system. This knowledge attempts to describe the performance of PSIs
and their relation to observable outcomes. This representation is easier to interpret and
assess by system experts, since it attempts to represent a cause-effect relation between
states of the risk system and observed outcomes, respectively.
If knowledge about the risk system is represented by the eFMEA presented in section
5.2.2, then g could be deﬁned as the system of linear equations formed by:
∑
s∈S
a js ·P{y= s} ≈ f (o j) ∀ j = 1, ...,M (5.2)
∑
s∈S
P{y= s}= 1
P{y= s} ≥ 0 ∀s ∈S
Where a js is the frequency of occurrence of outcome j when the risk system is in state
s. This risk system outcome frequency (RS-outcome frequency) is estimated using the
assessments of experts in the eFMEA (column 10 of table 5.1). Let λyi(o j) be the eFMEA
PSI-state outcome frequency (for outcome type o j when intervention i is in state yi). If a
model is created for each individual intervention, then we would have a jyi = λyi(o j) for
each intervention i, and for each outcome type o j. However, when we want to track more
than one intervention at once, N > 1, these assessments should be combined for each state
of the risk system, as follows.
a js =
N
∑
i=1
(yi∈s)
λyi(o j) ∀ j = 1, ...,M (5.3)
∀s ∈S
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Where s= (y1,y2,y3, ...,yN) is a state of the risk system.
f (o j) is obtained by ﬁnding the frequency of outcome type j in the same units of
λyi(o j).
The objective of the formulation deﬁned in (5.2) is to ﬁnd the probability distribution
of the possible states of the risk system that is consistent with the current knowledge
about the risk system, represented by the coefﬁcients a js, and some function of the ob-
served outcomes, represented by f (o j). The ﬁrst equation in (5.2) is analogous to the
ﬁrst moment or the expected value of a js with respect to the probability distribution of
y as it relates to a predetermined function of the observable data. In this research, we
use the linear risk model to monitor the performance of patient safety interventions. We
use the interpretation of probabilities as a measure of the uncertainty about risk, which is
determined by the state of knowledge about the performance of the delivery system [133].
The simplest case is when the risk system has only one intervention (N = 1) and when
there is only one type of outcome (M = 1). This is illustrated in the following system of
equations:
a0 ·P{y= 0}+a1·P{y= 1} ≈ f (o) (5.4)
P{y= 0}+P{y= 1}= 1
P{y= 0},P{y= 1} ≥ 0
In this case, only one equation is needed to estimate the probability distribution, since
the risk system has only two states {0,1}.
However, in most healthcare institutions, there are many interventions to be moni-
tored, along with several patient safety data sources. Each intervention may be linked
to more than one outcome type, and conversely, some outcome types may be potentially
affected by more than one intervention. An example for the latter is the identiﬁcation of
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use of Vitamin K through a trigger tool that suggests the presence of over-anticoagulation
with Warfarin [170]. This outcome may be evidence of irregularities in an intervention
that attempts to prevent adverse drug events, such as a guided prescription program within
in the computerized physician order entry system or in a management protocol to correct
over-anticoagulation with oral vitamin K [171].
In addition, according to the deﬁnition of the risk system and its corresponding state
vector y, the possible number of states of the system grows exponentially with the number
of patient safety interventions. So, the model will most likely be a linear system of M+ 1
equalities with n unknowns, where M > 2 and n>M.
This problem will most likely have inﬁnitely many solutions. Thus, there is the need
for a criterion to select among these solutions without adding bias or omitting any rele-
vant information. We use the principle of maximum entropy as the criterion to select the
most unbiased probability distribution among those feasible. In the following section, we
introduce the concept of entropy and the principle of maximum entropy (Maxent)[18] and
formulate the model as it corresponds to the proposed application.
5.3 Maximum Entropy Model to Identify Risk Sources
We propose to use the principle of maximum entropy (Maxent) [18] to estimate the
probability mass function of the states of the risk system based on the most recent eFMEA
and observed patient safety data. Entropy is a measure of information and uncertainty of
a random variable [172, 173]. Maxent is generally used to make inferences about prob-
ability distributions of variables, so that the probability distributions are consistent with
available, but incomplete, data [174]. Probability distributions with higher entropy are
preferred [175].
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Applications of Maxent include language processing [176], text classiﬁcation [177],
economy [178], aggregation of experts’ predictions [179], production analysis [180], and
ecology [181, 182], among many others.
We are interested in estimating a probability distribution for y, which is consistent
with the current system risk model parameters, a js, and available data, f . Shannon’s en-
tropy function of y, H(y), is a function that maps the probability mass function (pmf) of y
into a real number deﬁned by:
H(y) =− ∑
s∈S
P{y= s} · ln(P{y= s}) (5.5)
The Maxent model is a nonlinear programming model whose objective is to maxi-
mize Shannon’s entropy of the variable of interest [183], while meeting some constraints
determined by knowledge about the the variable or its pmf. The decision variables are
the probabilities of each state of the variable of interest. In our case, the constraints are
obtained from equations (5.2).
In summary, the formulation of the Maxent model follows:
Objective
max H(y)
Subject to:
∑
s∈S
a js ·P{y= s} ≈ f (o j) ∀ j = 1, ...,M (5.6)
∑
s∈S
P{y= s}= 1
P{y= s} ≥ 0 ∀s ∈S
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To avoid overﬁtting, the expected value under the probability distribution should be
close to the observed frequency, rather than equal to it [182]. We used a small value, ε j,
so that equations (5.6) become:
f (Xj)− ε j ≤
n
∑
i=1
a ji · pi ≤ f (Xj)+ ε j ∀ j = 1, ...,m
It can be veriﬁed that, in the absence of constraint (5.6), the program yields the dis-
crete uniform probability mass function, where:
P{y= s1}= ...= P{y= sn}= 12n ∀s1,s2 ∈S
The discrete uniform distribution is the distribution with maximum uncertainty, and
it means that we have no information about y. Thus, there is no reason to believe that one
state of the risk system is more (or less) likely than others. The literature presents efﬁcient
solution algorithms that can solve this problem [176, 184].
5.3.1 Practical Considerations
In a practical setting, there are many PSIs and many outcomes that can be potentially
considered to build the desired model. However, it is important that PSIs and outcomes,
included in the model, have certain characteristics so that the resulting model is sound
for risk identiﬁcation. In particular, this section addresses how to decide what PSIs and
outcomes to include and provides suggestions to guide experts’ assessments so that the
left hand side of the ﬁnal linear system of equations is consistent, and the model can
be potentially useful. In addition, some comments about the solution of the model are
presented at the end.
98
We ﬁrst outline the conditions, and then interpret these as instructions to guide the
assessment of PSI-state outcome frequencies. The conditions follow:
1. Each outcome type included in the model should be associated with at least one
intervention.
If a particular outcome o j is not related to any PSI, then λyi(o j) = 0 ∀yi ∈ Si, i =
1, ...,N, and therefore, the corresponding coefﬁcients in the linear system (obtained
through equation (5.3)) would all be 0. If a positive frequency is observed for that
particular outcome in a period, then the linear system will have an equation with a
zero left hand side and a positive right hand side, and therefore, the system would
be inconsistent.
2. Each PSI included in the formulation should be linked to at least one outcome type.
If an intervention is not related to any observable outcomes included in the model,
then there will not be enough information to distinguish the various states of the
risk system that differ only on the state of that particular intervention. For example,
if s(1) and s(2) ∈ S are two different states of the risk system that differ only in the
state of intervention l ∈I :
∀i ∈I ,∃o j ∈ O,yi ∈Si : λyi(o j)> 0 (5.7)
s(1) = (y1(1),y2(1), ...,yl(1), ...,yN(1))
s(2) = (y1(2),y2(2), ...,yl(2), ...,yN(2))
yi(1) = yi(2) ∀i = l
Then, if λyl(o j) = 0, ∀o j ∈ O , it can be shown that a j1 = a j2, ∀ j = 1, ...,M
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The resulting Maxent probability distribution would have equal probabilities for
these two particular states. In practice, interventions without observable outcomes
associated with them should be removed from the model.
3. The state frequency of an outcome should be different for at least one of the states
of the corresponding PSI(s).
This condition ensures that the observed frequency of the outcome is allocated in
different proportions to the different states of the risk system, which differ only in
the state of the particular intervention. In this way, the model can help distinguish
among PSI states through the observed outcomes, by assigning different probabili-
ties to different states.
4. If an intervention is related to more than one outcome, then at least one of these
outcomes should have a different PSI-state frequency from the others.
Furthermore, the difference between the frequencies of an outcome in the different
states (λyi=1(o j)−λyi=0(o j)) should be different for at least one of these outcomes.
These conditions allow each outcome to represent the performance of a particular
intervention at different levels of accuracy.
5. If an outcome is related to more than one intervention, then the corresponding out-
come frequencies for different interventions should be different.
6. Each PSI should be related to the least number of outcomes possible.
If the goal is to ensure that the right hand side of the proposed model is consistent,
then ideally each intervention should be associated to only one outcome. In such
a case, keeping track of each outcome separately would be sufﬁcient to track the
performance of the PSIs. However, this one-to-one relationship may not be realistic
in most settings. Therefore, the model we propose is useful for the cases when PSIs
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are related to more than one outcome, and when outcomes may be shared by more
than one PSI. Still, the more overlap between PSIs and outcomes makes it more
likely that the resulting coefﬁcients form an inconsistent model.
When many PSIs and outcomes overlap, the possibilities for an inconsistent model
increase. It can be proved that the above conditions guarantee consistency in the left
hand side of a system in which each intervention is related to up to two of the out-
comes. The case where each intervention is related to up to 3 or more outcomes is
more difﬁcult to verify analytically, due to the number of possible combinations of
values and relations to be considered. However, all experiments in this work were
done with PSIs related to up to three outcomes that meet the speciﬁed conditions,
helping verify that the conditions help ensure the consistency of the model.
The conditions above can be translated into directions to guide assessments during
an eFMEA. The following type(s) of outcome(s) should be identiﬁed for each PSI of
interest: one highly sensitive outcome, and a few outcomes (the minimum possible, but
necessary) that are moderately and remotely sensitive to the performance of such a PSI.
An outcome is highly sensitive to a state of an intervention when the occurrence of
a few of these outcomes represents high evidence of the intervention’s being in such a
state. There may be a particular outcome whose occurrence strongly indicates that an
intervention is in a particular state. For example, if a few patients actually fall, then we
may say that there is strong evidence that the Fall Prevention and Management aid [185]
is in a faulty state. Highly sensitive outcomes can also be thought of as those that are
undesirable, such as adverse events, and that should be acted upon as soon as possible.
These outcomes should be identiﬁed upon implementation of the intervention as the spe-
ciﬁc outcomes that such a PSI is intended to prevent. Highly sensitive outcomes probably
have the smallest PSI state frequency among all the outcomes related to the corresponding
state(s) of the intervention(s).
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Each intervention may have other outcome types that depend on its states, but these
may be less sensitive, i.e. moderately or remotely sensitive. These outcomes may repre-
sent some evidence of the PSI’s being in a particular state, but more evidence would be
needed to make a conclusion. These outcomes are not critical, and the occurrence of a
few of them may even imply that the intervention is working as intended. For example, a
few near-misses about the lack of patient knowledge regarding discharge instructions may
imply that an intervention aimed at conﬁrming discharge information directly with the
patient is working as intended, since it is detecting patients that are misinformed before
they leave the hospital. These outcomes may also be related to other interventions. In
the example, the near-miss described may also mean that the intervention to educate the
patient (if any) is not working as intended.
Once assessments are obtained, and model parameters are calculated using equation
(5.3) to form the system of equations, then the actual frequency of outcomes observed in
a period of interest is obtained. If particular outcomes are not observed in a period, then
their corresponding equations can be omitted from the Maxent model. Since patient safety
data is often incomplete, lack of data does not necessarily imply the no-occurrence of the
corresponding outcomes. For example, the lack of near-misses of a particular type does
not mean that the corresponding incident did not occur. The omission of the correspond-
ing equation is interpreted as having no evidence regarding the corresponding outcome.
On the other hand, including such an equation in the model implies that there is evidence
that the corresponding outcome had a frequency of 0 in the period of interest. This equa-
tion will cause the probability of the states, corresponding to such an intervention, to be
smaller, implying that it is working as intended.
Regarding solution, most software packages can solve the Maxent formulation. How-
ever, there may be computational limitations related to combinatorial explosion, since
the states of the risk system grow exponentially with the number of PSIs. One way to
approach this situation is to use additional information about the risk system to select a
102
subset of S to be included in the model, and thus reduce the computational burden. The
analyst may be interested in states that have up to a certain number of interventions in
the failed state at the same time (represented by a 1 in the position of the corresponding
intervention). For example, we may be interested in ﬁnding the probability of risk system
states that have up to 3 interventions in the failed state at the same time (states with up
to three 1’s). The Maxent formulation will produce a pmf over the states included in the
model. In our simulation of a risk system with 8 PSIs, we only included states that have
up to 3 PSIs in the failed state, which reduced the number of variables from 256 to 93
without compromising the quality of the resulting pmf. In a practical context, whenever
there are computational limitations that hinder the solution of the larger formulation, we
suggest to solve the model with the least number of states that make sense to the analyst,
and to increase the number of states sequentially until the probability distribution does not
show signiﬁcant changes.
The next section presents the simulation used to validate our methodology and evalu-
ate its performance under different scenarios.
5.3.2 Experimental Results
We developed a simulation to evaluate the validity of our proposed model by verifying
that the probability distribution obtained from the Maxent model is an accurate represen-
tation of the real probability distribution in a decision making context. We evaluated pmf
accuracy, i.e., measure of how consistent the Maxent pmf is, to be used as a marker of the
“real” pmf, and ranking accuracy, i.e., measure of how accurate the ranking of the states
of the risk system is. We veriﬁed the accuracy of the ranking of the top 1, 3, and 5 states.
In the ﬁrst stage of validation, we assumed that the parameters provided by experts
are consistent with the simulated “reality”. We also used the simulation to illustrate the
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usability of the method, and to identify potential shortcomings of our methodology in a
practical environment, where experts’ assessments deviate from this “reality”.
5.3.2.1 Simulation
For each experiment, the risk system was simulated as follows. The system has N
PSIs, each of which can be in one of two states, namely: normal operation, represented
by a value of 0, and failed state, represented by a value of 1. There are M categorical
outcome types that can be observed in the form of frequencies in a period. PSI-state out-
comes frequencies were speciﬁed for each intervention and each outcome.
The state of the risk system was deﬁned as a vector whose elements represent the state
of each PSI. There are n = 2N states of the risk system. PSI-state outcome frequencies
were deﬁned according to the considerations outlined in section 5.3.1, and outcome fre-
quencies for each state of the risk system (RS-state outcome frequencies) were obtained
using equation (5.3). States of the risk system were generated according to a pre-speciﬁed
probability mass function (the true pmf), and the “actual” outcomes were simulated using
M Poisson distributions, whose means are the corresponding RS-state outcome frequen-
cies.
The proposed approach combines available data with experts’ assessments to ﬁnd an
estimate for the pmf of the states of the risk system. Experts’ knowledge is represented
by the estimates λyi(o j) that form the corresponding coefﬁcients, a js, in the linear system.
However, there is no guarantee that these assessments will match the ideal parameters that
the model should have to be a valid representation of reality.
Let λ ∗yi(o j) be the ideal PSI-state outcome frequency for outcome type o j when in-
tervention i is in state yi. We speciﬁed λ ∗yi(o j) to simulate the risk system, and deﬁned
some modiﬁcations to these parameters, in order to simulate scenarios of experts’ knowl-
edge that would form the corresponding Maxent formulation. In general, there are two
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scenarios that represent the possible characteristics of λyi(o j) with respect to λ ∗yi(o j).
The ﬁrst scenario refers to the case where the model parameters are consistent with the
behavior of the real system, namely consistent model. The second scenario refers to the
case where the model parameters are biased with respect to the behavior of the system,
namely, biased model. The model is consistent whenever:
λyi(o)≈ λ ∗yi(o j) ∀yi ∈Si, ∀o j ∈ O
The model is biased when experts are biased, which means that their assessments
may deviate from “reality”. Two types of biases were deﬁned. The ﬁrst type results in
an overestimated model, in which PSI-state outcome frequencies provided by experts are
higher than the true frequencies for the undesirable states (i.e. state 1) and lower than the
true frequencies, perhaps zero, for desirable states (i.e. state 0). Overestimated parameters
were simulated using λ ∗yi(o j) and a scaling factor, δ , so that:
λyi(o) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
δ ·λ ∗yi(o j) for yi = 1,
0 for yi = 0
(5.8)
The second type of bias does not have a particular structure; therefore we called the
corresponding model the general bias model. There may be PSI-state outcome frequen-
cies that are either lower or higher for any of the states. Still, it was assumed that the
experts know which observable data is linked to each intervention. In our simulation, we
randomly changed the non-zero frequencies. To simulate this scenario, we multiplied
the true PSI-state outcome frequencies of undesirable states by a random number and
rounded the result to the closest integer. We made sure that the outcome frequency was
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higher for undesirable than desirable states by adding them and using this result as the
state outcome frequency for undesirable states.
For each scenario, we implemented the Maxent formulation speciﬁed in section 5.3
to obtain the Maxent pmf, and to determine the pmf accuracy and the ranking accuracy.
Each scenario was simulated up to 100 times. We experimented with instances with 2,
3, 4, 6, 8 and 10 PSIs. Each one of these instances was designed with M = N, and PSI-
outcome frequencies were assigned as recommended in section 5.3.1, using values from
table 5.9. In addition, we simulated cases where M < N, using subsets of the outcomes
originally deﬁned, and where recommended considerations to build the model are not
necessarily followed. These cases were intended to illustrate the corresponding output of
the model.
The results showed no signiﬁcant difference in the performance of our approach rela-
tive to the size of the risk system; therefore, we present most of our illustrations based on
a risk system with four PSIs (N = 4).
5.3.2.2 Results for the Consistent Model
Table 5.2: Experimental results for consistent model
Number of Number of pmf Accuracy State Ranking Accuracy (%)
Interventions (N) Outcomes (M) (Correlation) Top 1 Top 3 Top 5
2 2 0.82 37 82 100
3 3 0.87 46 82 88
4 4 0.86 38 76 85
6 6 0.97 85 84 86
8 8 0.92 64 84 82
10 10 0.93 92 92 86
Initially, the performance of the model was evaluated assuming that the experts’ as-
sessments of the model parameters correspond to the simulated reality. Table 5.2 shows
the summary results for each one of the system conﬁgurations evaluated. We also simu-
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lated a consistent model for conﬁgurations with less outcomes than PSIs. In the case of a
system with 4 PSIs, we simulated different instances with 1, 2, 3 and 4 outcome types that
do not necessarily follow the recommendations outlined in section 5.3.1. The results are
shown in ﬁgure 5.1 and summarized in table 5.3.
To simulate the risk system with one outcome type, we ran the simulation and for-
mulated the model using each outcome separately. Similarly, the system with M < N
outcomes was simulated by using a subset of the outcomes in the Maxent formulation
at a time. Figure 5.1 shows the results of the simulation of one random iteration. The
ﬁgure presents up to two of the instances considered for each number of outcome types
modeled.
Figure 5.1: Results for consistent model (4 PSIs)
It is desired that states with higher simulated probability are assigned a higher prob-
ability by the model so that we can use this probability measure to prioritize states of the
risk system. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, the probability distribution obtained from the
Maxent model behaves in a similar fashion as the simulated one, except for the cases in
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Table 5.3: Experimental results for consistent model (N = 4)
Number of Instance pmf Accuracy State Ranking Accuracy (%)
Outcome Types (M) (Correlation) Top 1 Top 3 Top 5
4 1 0.86 38 76 85
3 1 0.86 32 75 86
3 2 0.63 30 51 65
3 3 0.84 24 72 82
3 4 0.84 40 77 84
2 1 0.79 11 66 79
2 2 0.85 39 74 85
2 3 0.52 26 43 60
2 4 0.42 19 45 55
1 1 0.51 22 42 59
1 2 0.83 23 70 83
1 3 0.38 23 49 58
1 4 0.22 18 25 37
which the number of outcome types was lower than the number of interventions, limiting
the amount of information available for each intervention.
Table 5.3 shows, for each instance, the correlation between the simulated vs. the mod-
eled probability, and the accuracy for the top 1, 3 and 5 states ranked according to the
output of the model. The ranking accuracy for the top l states is deﬁned as the percentage
of states ranked in the ﬁrst l places, when they should have been ranked in these places
according to the true pmf. The instance with 4 outcome types was very similar to the
simulated probability, since most of the considerations speciﬁed in section 5.3.1 were in-
corporated in the model parameters. This similarity can be conﬁrmed in table 5.3, where
the correlation is 0.86. The ranking accuracy can be interpreted as 38% of the iterations
identiﬁed the most relevant state (top 1). Similarly, 76% of the iterations correctly identi-
ﬁed the top 3 states, and 85% of them correctly identiﬁed the top 5.
The ﬁrst, third and fourth instances of the model with 3 outcomes had parameters in
which all PSIs were associated with the outcomes considered. The pmf correlation and
the quality of the ranking were maintained. The second instance with 3 outcomes used
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parameters in which one of the PSIs was not related to any of the outcomes; therefore the
indicators showed less accuracy, both for pmf and ranking.
In the examples where 2 outcome types were used, pmf and ranking accuracy de-
creased, since it was more difﬁcult to cover all PSIs with such few outcomes. In the ﬁrst
instance, outcome 1 was related to PSIs 1, 3 and 4, and outcome 2 was related to PSIs 2
and 3, thus covering all PSIs. In the second, third and fourth instances, outcomes were
associated with 2 and 3 PSIs each, but there was no information about one of the PSIs.
Finally, the instances where only one of the outcomes was considered at a time had
parameters that related the outcome to 2, 3 and 1 interventions respectively, but where up
to 2 PSIs were not represented by these outcomes.
Figure 5.1 shows that given the limited information about the risk system, the re-
sulting pmf ranges from being very similar to the simulated pmf, to being almost ﬂat, as
expected.
These preliminary results conﬁrm that the more data about interventions available, the
better the assessment is, since each data type contributes to better differentiating among
the possible states of the risk system. The results obtained from the experiments helped
validate the model for the case when the parameters are consistent with the “parameters”
of the real system. In general, the model helps distinguish between likely and unlikely
states. However, it was noted that in some instances, the model cannot distinguish among
likely states (states with non-zero probability), due to the quality of the particular data
used in terms of how it relates to the different states of the risk system. Still, we empha-
size that even in the case where the model cannot distinguish among likely states, it helps
reduce the number of candidate risk sources to prioritize for further investigation efforts
in the light of the observed patient safety data.
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5.3.2.3 Results for Biased Model
Overestimated parameters were simulated using equation (5.8) to modify the param-
eters from the consistent model. We varied the scaling factor, δ , over the values of 2, 3, 5
and 8. Results for examples with 4 PSIs and 4 outcomes are illustrated in ﬁgure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Results for overestimated parameters
Table 5.4: Experimental results for overestimated parameters (N = 4)
Scaling Factor Correlation State Ranking Accuracy (%)
(δ ) Top 1 Top 3 Top 5
1 0.860 38 76 85
2 0.795 53 68 77
3 0.731 53 68 76
5 0.697 53 68 76
8 0.678 53 68 76
The general behavior of the Maxent pmf agrees with that of the true probability dis-
tribution, even though the correlation decreased slightly as δ increased. Table 5.4 also
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shows that the ranking accuracy of the model was maintained. Additionally, there were no
infeasible iterations in these scenarios.
In the case of general bias, the RS-state outcome frequencies deviated signiﬁcantly
and randomly from the true parameters. For the analysis of this scenario, we used the
parameters from the consistent model, and modiﬁed it according to section 5.3.2.1. A
signiﬁcant amount of instances yielded no feasible solution (64% - 88% of the instances
evaluated). Therefore, infeasibility can be used as a marker of bias in the model and of the
need for reassessment of the corresponding parameters.
There were mixed results for instances with a feasible solution, as shown in table 5.5.
The correlation and ranking accuracy suggest that most of these resulted in a pmf that
could be useful for decision making. However, there may be instances where the resulting
probability distribution deviates signiﬁcantly from the real one.
Table 5.5: Experimental results for feasible, biased instances
No. of Interventions Feasible Correlation Ranking Accuracy (%)
(N) Instances (%) Top 1 Top 3 Top 5 Top 10
2 66 0.651 59 76 - -
3 85 0.777 68 75 85 -
4 19 0.592 32 56 65 82
6 3 0.891 33 67 67 83
8 29 0.500 51 41 33 42
10 7 0.317 14 29 31 29
Feasible instances that resulted from biased models were further analyzed in terms of
a probability score calculated for each individual intervention. This probability score was
obtained by adding the probabilities of the states where the corresponding intervention is
not working as intended (states where the value of yi for the corresponding intervention is
1).
In the case of 4 interventions, 71% of the 28 feasible instances ranked the top 1 in-
tervention within the top 2 of the priority list. In the case of 8 PSIs, 60% of the 29 feasi-
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ble instances ranked the top 1 intervention within the top 2 of the priority list, and 74%
ranked it within the top 3.
In general, we conclude that the output of the Maxent model can be used to guide
investigation efforts or to diagnose the need for reassessment of model parameters. RCA
can be used to analyze the output of the Maxent model.
The above experimental results helped verify that a model that combines data and
knowledge about the system in a non-biased manner can provide accurate assessments
useful for decision making (construct validity). In addition, experimentation helped iden-
tify the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed formulation in the presence of bias.
In the next section we illustrate risk identiﬁcation and monitoring using the proposed
Maxent formulation.
5.4 Risk Identiﬁcation and Monitoring
Healthcare systems use patient safety data to guide risk management efforts in the
identiﬁcation of risks and their causes or sources. The proposed approach is intended to
support this analysis by using qualitative risk assessment to create links between data
and risk sources, and then using these links to systematically “translate” observed data
into likely sources. Therefore, our approach helps determine the appropriate investigative,
preventive or corrective actions needed to enhance patient safety on a more frequent basis.
This information can even guide strategies that require less resources, such as determining
the focus for weekly awareness campaigns to keep healthcare workers attentive of poten-
tial failures with speciﬁc PSIs.
The resulting pmf of the states of the risk system, and additional information from the
eFMEA, can be used to estimate an updated likelihood of each PAE. If the likelihood of
some PAE is above a pre-speciﬁed threshold, then the source can be tracked by identify-
ing the states of the risk system and the corresponding patient safety interventions, which
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likely contributed to the observed outcomes. PSIs with high probabilities of being in the
undesirable states can be regarded as potentially relevant sources.
For each analysis period, patient safety data should be gathered and transformed into
frequencies f (o j), ∀o j : f (o j) > 0. The corresponding Maxent model can be formulated
and solved to obtain an assessment of P{y = s}, ∀s ∈ S . Each analysis period can be a
speciﬁc month, week, or day; periods may also overlap (i.e. the last 2 weeks).
Table 5.6 illustrates an example of the direct output of the model, using the results
from the simulation experiments of a risk system with 4 interventions and 4 outcomes.
The example shows that the most likely state of the risk system is where all interven-
tions are working as intended (state (0,0,0,0)). However, there is a relatively high prob-
ability (0.28) for the state in which intervention 1 alone is not performing as intended,
represented with the vector (1,0,0,0). Other states may be considered by the analyst to
have an acceptable or low probability, and thus the focus would remain on investigating
intervention 1 ﬁrst. If, for example, intervention 1 corresponds to the use of a bar code
medication administration system, then the hospital staff can be warned to be aware of
problems in the use of such a system. Furthermore, users can be encouraged to report
issues in using such an intervention during the administration of medication to patients.
Using the states of the risk system, as opposed to individual interventions, will help
identify potentially relevant interactions among several interventions at the same time.
Nevertheless, a likelihood score for the failed state of each PSI can be calculated using
the probability assessments of all RS-states. This score is obtained by adding the prob-
abilities of the states where the corresponding intervention is not working as intended
(states where the value of yi for the corresponding intervention is 1). Illustrative results
are shown in table 5.7. This likelihood can also be used for analysis over longer periods,
for example, using run charts to detect when the performance of the intervention changes
dangerously. Information about potentially dangerous performance trends helps identify
the interventions that require close monitoring of their processes and equipment at some
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Table 5.6: Maxent model output
State of the Risk System (s) Probability Rank
(y1,y2,y3,y4)
(0,0,0,0) 0.4819 1
(1,0,0,0) 0.2800 2
(0,0,0,1) 0.0677 3
(1,0,0,1) 0.0393 4
(0,0,1,0) 0.0366 5
(0,1,0,0) 0.0336 6
(1,0,1,0) 0.0212 7
(1,1,0,0) 0.0195 8
(0,0,1,1) 0.0051 9
(0,1,0,1) 0.0047 10
(1,0,1,1) 0.0030 11
(1,1,0,1) 0.0027 12
(0,1,1,0) 0.0025 13
(1,1,1,0) 0.0015 14
(0,1,1,1) 0.0004 15
(1,1,1,1) 0.0002 16
Table 5.7: Likelihood scores for the failed state of each PSI
PSI Score
1 0.3674
2 0.0651
3 0.0705
4 0.1231
point in time, even if their likelihood of being in an undesired state appears to be low. One
of the advantages of our approach is that these types of analysis can be automated using
information technology to trigger alarms when necessary.
The likelihood score can also be used to ﬁnd a weighted likelihood of each type of
potential adverse event (PAE) analyzed in the eFMEA:
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Likelihood(e) = ∑
s∈Si
Likelihood(e|yi = s)P{yi = s} (5.9)
The value for Likelihood(e|yi = s) can be obtained from the eFMEA (column 11 in
table 5.1). This likelihood can be kept up to date and compared to experts’ assessments
used to create risk maps [4]. These updated assessments can be used to represent likeli-
hood using intervals, rather than single points in the risk map. Having intervals in a risk
map introduces information about uncertainty about PAEs into the analysis, and helps
identify speciﬁc areas where information beyond experts’ knowledge and available patient
safety data is needed to reduce such uncertainty.
If some PAE has a likelihood that is greater than a threshold, or that has signiﬁcantly
shifted from the original assessment, then further analysis can be guided by the Maxent
output table 5.6, as shown above. Traditional investigative and risk analysis techniques,
such as RCA, can be used to check the validity of ﬂags derived from the model.
Our experimentation showed that if the model is consistent with reality, then the re-
sulting probability distribution can be used to guide decisions regarding which PSIs to fo-
cus on ﬁrst. In addition, the model shows robustness when the true parameters are overes-
timated according to the expression (5.8). In instances with random bias where a feasible
solution existed, results are not as accurate, but they are still useful to guide risk analysis
if the top 3 PSIs (according to the failed likelihood score) are considered for analysis.
Therefore, the we conclude that the model has utility for guiding risk identiﬁcation and
analysis.
Additionally, we observed that most biased instances were infeasible. Being able to
identify that the model is biased is important, since it helps avoiding the allocation of
resources to PSIs that may be working as intended or ignoring PSIs that may require
immediate attention. A biased model may also reﬂect the need for new assessments to
update the knowledge about the performance of the system, and the corresponding model
parameters. The next section speciﬁes how to identify bias in the model using feasibility,
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and how to use the corresponding information to guide the updating of experts’ assess-
ments.
5.4.1 Identifying Bias
The most effective way to determine if there is bias in the model is to use the resulting
pmf to guide an RCA of the most salient outcomes and risk system states. The RCA
should aim to conﬁrm that the observed outcomes were actually the result of the (failed)
performance of the speciﬁc PSI that the model points to. Failure to conﬁrm such a cause
and effect relation would indicate the need for new assessments, as described in section
5.2.2 above.
Experimental analysis of the performance of the Maxent model under bias suggests
that infeasible instances likely reﬂect that the model is not consistent with reality, since
these instances were commonly observed when simulating scenarios where the model
parameters were biased. The possible reasons for the occurrence of an infeasible instance
include the lack of consistency between assessments for different outcome types and bias
of assessments with respect to reality. However, there may be a natural variability in the
system that may cause the formulation to be inconsistent, and minimal corrections may be
needed to obtain a feasible, usable solution.
In our simulation, we used a Poisson distribution to generate RS-state outcome fre-
quencies. Very few instances of the consistent model resulted infeasible due to this natu-
ral variability of outcomes. Whenever an instance yielded no feasible solution, we eval-
uated changes needed in the right hand side of equation (5.2), i.e., the frequencies of
each outcome type, to make it feasible. Required changes or adjustments were obtained
using the phase I of the 2-phase simplex method for linear programming [184, 186]. The
resulting (positive) artiﬁcial variables were added (or subtracted) to the corresponding
value of f (o j) and the Maxent model was formulated using the new right hand side, and
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solved. If the model parameters were consistent, adjustments needed were very small, and
the resulting pmf was very close to the simulated pmf.
On the other hand, instances with randomly biased parameters showed that high ad-
justments were needed to obtain a feasible solution (see table 5.8). In our model, the
parameters come from the experts’ assessment and represent their beliefs or knowledge
about the performance of the risk system with respect to observable outcomes. Therefore,
we assume that lack of consistency of an instance of our proposed model reﬂects inac-
curate knowledge about the risk system with respect to observable outcomes in patient
safety data sources. Adjusting the outcome data (right hand side) to ﬁt the model will
likely provide a biased solution that may be inaccurate in a decision making environment.
Table 5.8: Adjustments needed on the right hand side
RHS % of Original Value
f (o1) 7.35
f (o2) 3.25
f (o3) 35.99
f (o4) 48.53
Overall Change 23.78
Adjustments needed in infeasible instances ranged from 0% to 198% of the original
value of the right hand side. In the illustrative example of table 5.8, the observed fre-
quency of outcome types 3 and 4 required the highest adjustments, suggesting that the
relation of these outcomes with the corresponding PSIs needs to be reassessed. Future
risk assessment activities can then focus on revising the relation between the data types 3
and 4, and the corresponding PSIs.
In summary, an infeasible instance of the Maxent model is the ﬁrst indicator of bias
in the model. If high adjustments to the observed frequencies of outcomes are needed to
obtain a feasible solution, then the model is very likely biased. Information about PSIs
whose assessments are not consistent with actual occurrences can help guide the focus
of future risk assessments, or can help determine the need for formal measurement. Out-
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come types that required the highest adjustment represent data sources whose relation to
the risk system is inconsistent.
5.5 Discussion
This research developed a risk modeling framework based on using the state of patient
safety interventions (i.e. safety constraints in healthcare systems) as sources of risk, as
supported by the general safety literature. This chapter focused on illustrating how this
framework can be used to formulate a specific model that unifies risk assessment and
data analysis efforts, given the limitations of patient safety data. The model described
allows for the identification of potentially relevant risk sources, by estimating a probabil-
ity of such risk sources being in an undesirable state. The proposed model can be used
by healthcare risk managers or patient safety officers to determine the focus of periodic
awareness campaigns, and to provide direction for investigation efforts.
To smooth changes and capitalize on existing efforts, we based the proposed model
on an analysis similar to a FMEA, which is a widely accepted risk analysis method in
healthcare systems. We expanded the focus of the FMEA to include PSIs and their ex-
pected performance in terms of common sources of patient safety data. The assessments
obtained from the expanded FMEA were used as parameters of a model that supports
the analysis of less-severe outcomes. Such a model strictly reflects the shared knowledge
about risk the system, and can be used to guide future risk analysis efforts, and to validate
or challenge such knowledge in the light of actual outcomes.
In this work, we focused on evaluating the anticipated use of the proposed model in
the analysis of upcoming patient safety data. The challenges in such an analysis include
incompleteness of data and bias in its interpretation. Therefore we used the principle
of maximum entropy to reduce the effect of bias, and to account for incompleteness.
Experimental results using simulation showed that the model is useful to effectively guide
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risk identiﬁcation and analysis efforts when the model parameters are consistent with
reality. In addition, experimentation showed that the model is robust when experts’ as-
sessments overestimate outcomes, and that general bias can be identiﬁed through infea-
sibility. Furthermore, analysis of such infeasibility can be used to explicitly determine
where assessments need to be revisited.
The proposed approach uses modeling to complement traditional risk analysis meth-
ods, such as FMEA, so that the knowledge gained from these analyses is used frequently,
and in a consistent manner, before new assessments are obtained. In addition, other tools,
such as RCA, can be used to validate the causes of less severe outcomes to make sure
that the system is performing safely, rather than to ﬁnd the causes of adverse events after
they take place. Basically, we are converting a retrospective risk analysis method, such
as RCA, into a prospective one by using it to analyze minor, non-consequential events,
identify latent causes, and develop investigation and solution strategies before actual harm
takes place.
The proposed model advances healthcare risk analysis by providing a structure for
the many available sources of information about risk, and combining them in a model
that will both: facilitate and expedite risk analysis by directly pinpointing potentially
relevant risk sources, and help diagnose the need for new or updated assessments given
observed data. This research supports the healthcare risk management process in several
of its stages [4]. It facilitates the analysis of patient safety data for risk identiﬁcation. It
provides guidance into potential risk-sources, and deﬁnes a measure of the contribution
of each source to identiﬁed risks, for risk analysis. It helps translate data into internal
measures of the performance of solutions implemented, and allows for analysis to be done
on a frequent basis for monitoring and control.
The success of the proposed approach will translate into improved understanding of
risk in the system, prompt risk analysis and timely feedback to stakeholders. The model
will motivate the gathering of speciﬁc information about risk, since this information can
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be readily available for analysis as it is incorporated to the model. In addition, every PSI
that is considered for implementation would be evaluated considering their possible fail-
ure modes, or states, and the availability and quality of patient safety outcomes that can
be used to monitor their performance over time.
This type of model could potentially be used in sectors other than healthcare, since
the concept of safety constraint comes from the general safety literature. In general, the
approach is intended to facilitate the systematic analysis and interpretation of data that
comes from disparate data sources. Examples of these types of processes can be found in
most socio-technical systems, such as nuclear power plants, chemical plants and power
grids [163]. The risk system, i.e. the set of safety constraints, should be deﬁned within the
scope of the particular organization. Then, risk assessment methods should be adapted to
include observable and related data.
There are several opportunities for the improvement of the proposed formulation.
For example, the state of each PSI was deﬁned as a binary variable that represents the
intervention either working as intended or not. The deﬁnition of states of PSIs can be
expanded to include different forms of failure that may cause the intervention not to work
as intended. It may be useful to distinguish among forms of failure determined by human
factors, organizational factors and technical/mechanical factors.
In addition, the model considers a static picture of the performance of the system, and
therefore decisions related to its assessments are not guaranteed to be effective in the long
term. However, the proposed approach has an advantage in that analysis can be expedited
using information systems, and therefore, such an analysis can be done periodically to
account for system changes.
Furthermore, alternative underlying risk models that include the dynamics of the
performance of risk sources can be formulated. These models, represented by g in (5.1),
may be non-linear, and may not be general for the different types of PSIs.
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In future research, alternative characterizations of sources of risk can be incorporated
in the model. For example, speciﬁc activities, processes, or general services could be used
as sources of risk. Regardless of the characterization of risk sources, their states should
be deﬁned in a manner that facilitates assessment and interpretation of results for decision
making.
Finally, the proposed model is still limited by the knowledge of the analysts and ex-
perts who determine the parameters [187]. At this stage of the research, the aim is to
enhance the consistency of how risk assessments are used to assist risk managers and
patient safety ofﬁcers in their thinking. Still, there is the need to deﬁne formal methods
for the assessment of parameters that include experimentation and measurement in the
actual system.
The formulation of a Maxent model to support the identiﬁcation and analysis of risks
in healthcare systems conﬁrmed that there is the need for research to explore the use
of formal, systematic risk analysis models in this area. Such models should be able to
capture the outputs of qualitative methods and consider available data to expedite risk
identiﬁcation and analysis, and to facilitate the prevention of harm to patients.
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Table 5.9: Example of a PSI-state outcome frequency scale
Units: expected number of outcomes per week.
Score Description λyi(o j) Description
1 Highly sensitive [3,5] The particular outcome type
represents high evidence of
the intervention being in the
particular state. Attention is
required.
2 Moderately Sensitive [6, 10] The particular outcome type
represents some evidence of
the intervention being in the
particular state, but It may be
evidence of the performance
of other interventions as
well. More evidence is
needed.
3 Remotely Sensitive [11,∞] The particular outcome type
may be evidence of the
intervention being in the
particular state, but is also
a very common outcome
for other states. It may be
evidence of the performance
of other interventions as
well. More evidence is
needed.
4 Not Related 0 The particular outcome
type is not related to
the performance of the
intervention.
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Chapter 6: Summary and Future Work
The delivery of healthcare has been described as a high risk process given the alarm-
ing estimates of preventable adverse outcomes [20, 46]. Healthcare delivery systems
are dynamic, socio-technical complex systems, for which risk monitoring and control
remain a challenge for practitioners and researchers. The aim of this research was to
develop systematic approaches to monitor risk in healthcare systems, and guide allocation
of efforts to enhance patient safety. The main objective was to develop methodologies
based on commonly available patient safety data, widely-used risk analysis techniques,
and information systems to facilitate and guide risk identiﬁcation.
A critical factor at the core of healthcare service quality and cost is patient safety,
which is deﬁned as the prevention of harm to patients caused from failures in the health-
care system itself. Since the late nineties, preventable medical injuries have been recog-
nized as a major cause of death and disability in the U.S. Today, most healthcare insti-
tutions have patient safety programs that manage risks mainly through the analysis of
incident reports and the implementation of interventions. However, their effectiveness
has been debated [45, 52].
This research ﬁrst explored the ﬁeld of healthcare risk management and the literature
related to modeling risk in healthcare systems. Gaps and opportunities for formal mod-
eling and analysis of risks were identiﬁed. In particular, it was found that the character-
istics of healthcare systems and patient safety data make traditional statistical methods
unsuitable to assess risk or to monitor the performance of the system in terms of safety.
Furthermore, the development of models to support patient safety management has been
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hindered by a lack of understanding of risk in healthcare systems. We concluded that
effective methods for risk identiﬁcation in healthcare systems should explicitly character-
ize sources of risk to facilitate analysis and feedback, be dynamic to reﬂect the changing
nature of the service, have a prospective component to prevent adverse outcomes and sup-
port proactive decision making, have a quantitative component to allow monitoring and
evaluation, and use available patient safety data to continuously update our knowledge
about the system (chapter 2).
In the evaluation of risk analysis methods actually used in healthcare systems, it was
identiﬁed that some data sources, such as near-miss reports, are underutilized by solely
considering their frequency as a marker of risk. Near-miss reports are descriptions of
events that could have harmed patients but did not due to a timely intervention or a con-
venient evolution of the circumstances. They provide some evidence of risk in the sys-
tem before patients suffer adverse consequences. In addition, we found that existing risk
assessment methods do not explicitly support the monitoring of the performance of risk
sources over time, because risk analysis methods are time consuming.
Initially, the research focused on the analysis of one type of patient safety data, i.e.
near-misses. A taxonomy for near-miss reports was developed to facilitate reporting, data
storing, and systematic preprocessing. The proposed taxonomy structure has three basic
dimensions that attempt to describe a near-miss. These dimensions include information
about the activity that was taking place while the incident occurred, the immediate cause
of the breakdown, and the deﬁning characteristics of the near-miss. Each dimension can
be further subdivided in speciﬁc categories that depend on the organization for which the
analysis is intended. The taxonomy allows for coded near-miss reports to be accumulated
over time, and analyzed using clustering-based methods.
Clustering was used to ﬁnd combinations of near-miss attributes which may lead to
the identiﬁcation of risk sources when analyzed, and which may not be obvious to the
naked eye. Sources of risk were characterized by each cluster, and the attribute values
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of the elements within the cluster. An adapted, unsupervised version of the k-prototypes
algorithm was used to allow for the actual data to dictate the number and characteristics
of resulting clusters, and thus the identiﬁcation of unforeseen risk sources. Clusters were
characterized using high-support item-sets for categorical attributes, and low coefﬁcient-
of-variation numerical attributes. The output of this analysis is a list of potential risk
sources (clusters), ranked according to a measure that combines the number of reports
in the cluster and the closeness of its elements. Each cluster can be analyzed to conﬁrm or
reject its validity as a source of risk using traditional risk identiﬁcation methods such as
root cause analysis (RCA) or system hazard analysis (SHA). Near-misses and valid clus-
ters can be accumulated over time to be used in the analysis of future near-misses (chapter
3). This research was accepted for publication in the Journal of Biomedical Informatics
[19].
The possibility of deﬁning an explicit characterization of risk sources in terms of
components that should be monitored over time was explored. For this purpose, the lit-
erature of safety theory was reviewed, where the concept of safety constraints as sources
of risk was found. The general concept of safety constraints was mapped to the concept
of patient safety interventions in healthcare systems. Patient safety interventions con-
sist of technology, improved procedures, or new policies intended to improve care by
minimizing harm to patients, and thus risk [160]. Examples of these include a bar-code
medication administration system, a checklist before surgery, and the use of gloves and
gown while in contact with infection-risk patients. The use of patient safety interventions
to facilitate the risk identiﬁcation with the support of information systems was illustrated
in chapter 4.
In addition, an alternative modeling technique was proposed to systematically monitor
the performance of patient safety interventions using available data. The risk system was
deﬁned as the set of patient safety interventions within the system, and the state of the risk
system was deﬁned as the combination of the states of the interventions. The principle
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of maximum entropy was proposed to obtain a probability distribution of the possible
states of the risk system that is consistent with observed data in a period of interest. This
probability distribution is the least biased one, and uses only the information available.
The model can be built from experts’ assessments similar to those of a failure modes and
effects analysis. The output of this analysis approach is a list of states of the risk system
that can be ranked according to their probability. States of the risk system with higher
probability can be analyzed ﬁrst to identify which interventions, or groups of them, may
be not working as intended. This information is useful to guide subsequent risk analysis,
such as RCA. In addition, a probability-based score can be calculated for each interven-
tion individually. This risk score can be tracked over time to monitor the performance
of each intervention, make decisions related to enhancing awareness about potentially
relevant risk sources, identify and remedy weaknesses in safety programs or activities,
determine the focus of investigation efforts, and improve the quality of data.
Although the proposed approaches are limited by the quality of experts’ assessments,
they support the use of such assessments in a consistent manner. In addition, they stim-
ulate a better understanding of the healthcare delivery system, its patient safety inter-
ventions and their relation to different sources of more frequently observable data. They
reduce the time required to analyze data and identify sources of risk by using information
systems to automate some part of the analysis. They encourage the enhancement of pa-
tient safety data sources, such as incident reporting, since people would report in order to
identify substandard performance of a system component rather than to expose an error.
Finally, they potentially allow for explicitly deﬁning requirements and criteria to select
among potential solutions.
Findings in this research helped conﬁrm the need for the formal deﬁnition of sources
of risk and models that relate the performance of those sources to observable patient safety
data. Such approach can be used in industries other than healthcare, since the concept of
safety constraints comes from the general safety literature.
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Future research efforts along this line of research should focus on:
• Formal methods could be deﬁned for the assessment of parameters that include
experimentation and measuring in the actual system to complement experts’ as-
sessments.
• States of patient safety interventions could be further deﬁned using forms of failure
that may cause the interventions not to work as intended. For example, we may
want to distinguish among forms of failure determined by human factors, organi-
zational factors and technical/mechanical factors, among others.
• Alternative models of the performance of patient safety interventions could be
developed that better reﬂect the dynamics of these systems. These models may be
non-linear, and may not be general for the different types of patient safety interven-
tions.
• Alternative characterizations of sources of risk could be explored and used as it is
practical to organizations.
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